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Why andHow to Study Trade Union
Cooperation in Europe?
Abstract This chapter gives a general background to the issue of transna-
tional union cooperation in Europe and presents the aim, outline and
delimitations of the book. It also pays attention to a number of con-
cepts that can be relevant in the analysis of European trade unions and
industrial relations. In this way, a theoretical context is provided for the
analyses to come. There is moreover a rather detailed description of the
empirical materials and methods used in the following chapters.
Keywords Transnational trade union cooperation · Industrial relations ·
Data collection methods
Introduction
Against the background of a gradually widening and deepening Euro-
pean integration process, transnational trade union cooperation is of
great importance for workers. The trade union movement has tradition-
ally a strong position in Europe compared to other regions of the world,
but this strength is largely rooted in national industrial relations institu-
tions. The increasing integration and enlargement of the European inter-
nal market have created challenges for labour organizations to enhance
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their cross-border coordination and collaboration, not to be marginalized
in terms of influence when safeguarding the interests of their members
(Erne 2008; Gajewska 2009; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013;
Seeliger 2019).
A problem in this connection is that national unions in Europe are
experiencing setbacks due to declining membership numbers (‘union
density’) and decreasing power resources (Kelly 2015; Lehndorff et al.
2017). This is partly related to the EU integration process, for example
when the scope of action for unions at national level was reduced by
the European Court of Justice’s decisions in a series of notable judge-
ments in the early 2000s, in particular the so-called Laval Quartet of
rulings (Bücker and Warneck 2010). Moreover, in the aftermath of the
economic crisis starting in 2008, the increased transnational governance
of the Euro-zone countries within the EU brought widespread social con-
sequences for workers. Parts of the austerity policy following the crisis led
to a weakening of trade unions’ power and negotiating opportunities in
some countries, adding to the already existing pressures towards neo-
liberalization and decentralization of collective bargaining at national
level (Baccaro and Howell 2017; Marginson 2015).
The EU is sometimes depicted as a liberal market project, driven by
‘negative integration’, which means that the main project is to remove
barriers to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital
(Scharpf 1996). However, there have also been many discussions and ini-
tiatives over the years to introduce and strengthen elements of ‘positive
integration’, for example by shaping common identities, rights and con-
ditions for citizens in Member States (Rhodes 2015). These ambitions
are often referred to as the European ‘social dimension’ or even as ‘social
Europe’ (Seeliger 2019: 28–31). One quite recent example is the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights with its chapters setting up principles concern-
ing ‘Equal opportunities and access to the labour market’; ‘Fair working
conditions’ and ‘Social protection and inclusion’ (European Commission
2017).
Cooperation between trade unions in Europe is actually since long
supported and institutionalized by the European Commission as an inte-
grated part of the EU multilevel governance system. The Commission
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has facilitated structures for unions and employer associations to partici-
pate in both consultations on EU policies and social dialogue. This offers
possibilities of negotiating agreements that can be turned into direc-
tives (Rhodes 2015). Even though lately questioned by some unions and
researchers (Tricart 2019), the Commission has repeatedly emphasized
the importance of European-level social dialogue between trade unions
and employer organizations for EU governance:
Developing and fostering social dialogue is an essential element of the
European social model, as it plays a crucial role in promoting com-
petitiveness and fairness and enhancing economic prosperity and social
well-being. European social dialogue complements the social dialogue
happening at the national level. (European Commission 2016: 3)
Historically, the EU social dimension has been very much about employ-
ment and working life issues. To realize the European social model, a cru-
cial condition is that the labour organizations are able to take an active
role in safeguarding and advancing measures in the intended direction.
If they are to do so, they must be able to cooperate effectively across
national borders. This is especially difficult as union power is declining
at national level in many countries, while simultaneously many impor-
tant decisions are made in multinational companies and a lot of politics
has moved beyond the national arena.
Aim and Outline of the Book
This book aims to provide an analysis of transnational trade union
cooperation in Europe—its forms and focuses and its conditions and
obstacles. It is not only a study of union cooperation as such, but also
illustrates the interconnections between national and European indus-
trial relations. Thereby it gives examples of the workings of the European
integration process in the labour markets, and particularly of the poten-
tial and difficulties in developing and deepening the social dimension.
There are of course a number of limitations when we approach such
broad issues in a narrow format; of course, not everything of relevance
4 B. Furåker and B. Larsson
can be covered. As economic and political conditions change fast both
nationally and in the EU, we have to hit a moving target in our analy-
ses. Our empirical attention is mainly directed to cooperation between
unions at sectoral and cross-sectoral level. Therefore we have less to say
about the European structures of workers’ collaboration at company
level, established in the form of European Works Councils (EWCs),
important as they may be. For this level of union cooperation, the
reader has to search for other scholarly overviews (e.g., Hann et al. 2017;
Whittall et al. 2007).
Since our focus is on trade union cooperation, we provide few details
about the employer side and the European institutions as well as about
the interaction between these two and the unions, possibly with some
exception of Chapter 4. As we use broader scholarly research to place
union collaboration within the context of European industrial relations,
at least some anchor points are supplied for our analyses. The role of
EU institutions as facilitators and driving forces of union cooperation
has been covered in many useful overviews, on which we will lean
(e.g., Rhodes 2015; Smismans 2012; Welz 2008). With respect to the
employer side, there seem to be fewer studies, but there are quite a num-
ber of valuable overviews of the interactions between employers and trade
unions in European-level social dialogues (e.g., Keller and Weber 2011;
Perin and Léonard 2011; Prosser 2016; Tricart 2019).
Besides presenting the background and the aim of the book, this
introductory chapter has two major subsections. The first introduces
some main theoretical concepts and discusses different approaches to the
study of European industrial relations. One strand is the comparative
approach, which is usually about making comparisons between coun-
tries, between industrial relations regimes, or between sectors. Another
dimension is the existence of a supranational European level, which can
be scrutinized in terms of actors, institutions, interactions and outcomes.
The current chapter ends with a description of the empirical materials
used in the analyses in the book.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the patterns of cross-border union
cooperation based on our empirical studies. We begin with a brief dis-
cussion of the multilevel structures that exist in such collaboration and
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continue by presenting trade unions’ views on the importance of work-
ing together at different levels and on the potential benefits to be gained
through this. In the second section, we go into a more detailed discussion
about what topics and themes that are important in transnational union
cooperation and what forms of cooperation that are preferred in differ-
ent sectors and industrial relations regimes. The last parts of Chapter 2
examine the most important obstacles and facilitators to union collabo-
ration in Europe.
Then, in Chapter 3, we move to a more detailed analysis of an issue of
great importance for trade unions: statutory minimum wages. It is a case
study of union views regarding minimum wage legislation at national
and European levels. After providing some basic information on such
regulation in Europe, the analysis concentrates on different arguments
for and against it. Empirical data, from surveys as well as from interviews
and documents, are used to describe the positions taken by labour orga-
nizations. There is a deep cleavage on the topic in the European union
movement and the resistance to legislation is strongest in the Nordic
countries, whereas the opinion is much more positive in most other parts
of Europe. The European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC)—the
unions’ large cooperation organization in Europe—has thus had certain
difficulties to deal with, but it has been able to find a compromise that
its members can tolerate. Still, importantly, the issue of statutory mini-
mum wages is not something that all European labour organizations can
presently be expected to collaborate on.
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of another potentially divisive issue in
trade union cooperation: the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive
(PWD) which can be seen in light of the discussion on ‘social dumping’.
In 2016, the European Commission proposed a revision of the PWD
and it led to a great deal of debate, with a clear East–West division in
the reactions. The proposal aimed at eliminating certain kinds of social
dumping; the goal was that the same work in the same place should get
the same pay. Ministers and parliaments in several Central/Eastern Euro-
pean countries raised their voice against the revision. Employers’ organi-
zations were generally negative, while the trade union confederations at
European level were positive but not uncritical as they wanted a more
radical reform. No manifest East–West cleavage became visible in the
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trade union movement. Even in countries dismissive of the revision, the
main labour organizations supported the dominant union responses.
In the concluding Chapter 5, we summarize the results presented
in our analyses and revisit some of the contextual and theoretical dis-
cussion from the introductory chapter. The purpose of this is to draw
some general conclusions regarding the importance of understanding
trade union cooperation as dependent on organizational and other power
resources and the varieties of industrial relations and sectoral regimes
across Europe.
Trade Unions and Industrial Relations
in Europe
A trade union may be defined as ‘a continuous association of wage-earners
for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their
employment’ (Webb and Webb 1894: 1). By organizing in associations,
workers can avoid underbidding each other in the labour market and
they can defend or improve joint standards for employment and work-
ing conditions, either directly in collective bargaining with the employ-
ers or indirectly by influencing state regulations. The establishment of
trade unions and collective bargaining institutions can also be benefi-
cial to employer organizations and national governments, since they may
help to ‘maintain social peace and ensure the legitimacy of managerial
control’ (Traxler 1998: 208).
The aim and function of unions in the labour market and in soci-
ety can ideal-typically be depicted as threefold, and the balance between
these three aspects varies by tradition across Europe (Hyman 2001b).
From a labour market point of view, trade unions (and employer organi-
zations) may be seen as economic cartels negotiating the price of work and
employment conditions. According to this approach, the organizations
mainly defend the interests of their members, who may be employees in
a specific company, in certain occupations, or in a specific sector of the
economy. From a political point of view, unions may be regarded as social
movements aimed at resource mobilization for the working class in gen-
eral to influence state regulations of employment and working conditions
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or even to address more universal issues concerning wealth and welfare.
The solidarity of unions in this approach extends far beyond their mem-
bers. The third aim and function of trade unions can be said to relate
to overall social cohesion. They are then seen as civil society organizations
bridging the contradiction between labour and capital in ‘social partner-
ship’, dialogue and compromise (Hyman 2001b: 38–63). This approach
is thus less related to antagonistic relations and conflict, but rather to
overall ‘social responsibilities’ of the organizations. Unions are assumed
to cooperate with employers and the state for the overall good for work-
ers and companies in a certain sector of the economy or social cohesion
at large.
Trade unions may have different power resources linked to these
aims and functions (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 30–35;
Lehndorff et al. 2017). Their organizational power is based on their num-
ber of members, who through membership fees may build up financial
and staffing resources. Unions below the confederate level may range
from a few hundred or a few thousand members to millions of mem-
bers, as in the German services union Ver.di. This of course affects their
possibilities of financing and staffing various operations as well as mobi-
lizing members in action. Still, the most important may not be whether
a trade union has a large number of members, but whether or not it
organizes a large proportion of the employees. Just to give a sense of
such differences we can mention that overall union density in Europe
varies from around 4.5% in Estonia to above 90% in Iceland (Visser
2019). Another dimension is structural power that is close to organiza-
tional power, but is more about the bargaining strength of unions ver-
sus employers—in their company, occupation, sector or the economy at
large. This kind of strength is also a function of unemployment levels
and employers’ demand for labour. A third component is unions’ insti-
tutional power that has to do with their legal (institutionalized) rights to
organize, be consulted, bargain, have their agreements legally extended
and take industrial action. Unions’ societal power , finally, is based on their
ability to build alliances with political or civil society organizations and
influence public discourse. All these forms of power differ substantially
across countries and at the same time it must be stressed that they are
not independent of each other.
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The concept of industrial relations broadly refers to ‘/i/nteraction
between employers, employees, and the government; and the institutions
and associations through which such interactions are mediated’ (Brown
et al. 2018; italics added). The three italicized aspects of industrial
relations were already emphasized when the concept was theoretically
elaborated for analyses at national level, that is, rules, collective action,
bargaining and power relations were in focus (Dunlop 1958). By
emphasizing one of them above the others, we may actually talk about
three different approaches to industrial relations. A strong focus on
the associations—trade unions, employer organizations and the govern-
ment and their collective interests and power resources—leans towards
political economy and Marxist conflict-oriented traditions. If instead
concentrating on the relations and interactions between the collective
actors—through social dialogue, bargaining, lobbying or contentious
action such as demonstration strikes, blockades and lockouts—there is
a turn towards more of a strategic action perspective (Hyman 2001a:
5). Lastly, a concentration on the institutional aspect of industrial
relations—for example the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive
frames in which the collective actors and their interactions are embedded
and reproduced (Godard 2004)—tends towards a sociological or orga-
nizational neo-institutionalist approach. In this case, there is inspiration
from older theories based on functionalist reasoning. As we see it, the
differences between these views are not so much an issue of what is
fundamental in an ontological sense, since frequently in research all three
aspects exist and are mutually interdependent. This can be illustrated
by the definition of industrial relations as ‘institutional arrangements
shaped by legislative frameworks, historical traditions, accumulated
vested interests and learned patterns of behaviour’ (Hyman 1994: 1).
Even if the concept of industrial relations was originally developed to
study the institutionalized interactions between employers and employ-
ees within nation states, it is today often used in comparative and even
transnational analyses. There are at least three different approaches to
such studies and we will now briefly discuss these in turn.
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Comparisons of Industrial Relations in Europe
The most direct way to study European industrial relations is to compare
national industrial relations across countries. Such an approach com-
monly focuses on structural factors. The main ones used are trade union
and employer membership, the organizations’ power resources and the
power balance between them, local employee representation, collective
bargaining styles and coverage, levels of coordination or centralization of
bargaining, the social partners’ political influence and the role of the state
(e.g., Baccaro and Howell 2017; Visser et al. 2009; Henning 2015).
In dealing with a large number of countries, such comparisons run
the risk of getting quite messy. Thus, some selection of a smaller set
of countries is often needed in order to produce and present results
in digestible form. One possibility is that the selection is made on the
basis of a ‘varieties-of-capitalism’ perspective (Baccaro and Howell 2017;
Bamber et al. 2016; Seeliger 2019). Another approach, which is com-
monly applied in research including European and international com-
parisons, is to cluster countries on the basis of similarities into a smaller
set of regimes of industrial relations (Visser et al. 2009; Eurofound 2017)
or varieties or models of trade unionism (Gumbrell-McCormick and
Hyman 2013: 6–28; Hyman 2001b; Lehndorff et al. 2017).
Without a doubt these attempts to reduce variation have significant
advantages, but they can also have disadvantages, by reducing the existing
diversity too much. Anyway, we will try them out to test their explana-
tory power. We will soon discover their limitations, for example in con-
nection with specific problematic topics in union cooperation, such as
the question of statutory minimum wages to be dealt with in Chapter 3.
Empirically grounded typologies of European countries with a smaller
set of regimes or models of trade unionism—or welfare regimes, varieties
of capitalism, or employment regimes for that matter—generally tend to
single out the same geographic clusters of countries. We use the regional
terms Central/Eastern Europe, Central/Western Europe, Nordic region,
Southern Europe and Western Europe. Some central characteristics of
the regimes in these clusters are presented in Table 1.1 and will be elab-
orated briefly.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 Why and How to Study Trade Union Cooperation in Europe? 11
The many Central/Eastern European countries are quite diverse and it
may be questioned whether they make up a regime at all. As we can see in
Table 1.1, they are classified as belonging to a transitional or fragmented
regime of industrial relations. The term transitional refers to the changes
from the previous state socialist systems to liberal market economies,
while ‘fragmented’ signals both the variation between countries and the
social partners’ generally low degree of organization and coordination
within countries. Trade unions are quite weak in most of these nations,
union density is generally low and workers usually do not identify that
strongly with unions, partly because of their history. The tradition of
contentious action is weak, and several countries have clear restrictions
on the right to strike. Bargaining is mostly decentralized to the company
level, and even though national confederations exist, in many countries
the sectoral level is undeveloped. The social partners have relatively little
bargaining autonomy, as governments frequently have been more con-
cerned with the transition to a market economy than with regulating
labour relations (e.g., Bieler and Schulten 2008; Henning 2015; Visser
et al. 2009).
The Central/Western European countries Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland are described as having
a social partnership tradition (Bieler and Schulten 2008; Visser et al.
2009). Slovenia was later added to this category. In these countries, there
are developed tripartite and corporatist relations between trade unions,
employers and the state. They are thus said to belong to a social partner-
ship regime of industrial relations. The social partners have a high degree
of autonomy from the state, collective bargaining coverage is generally
high because of legal extension mechanisms, and unions’ political influ-
ence is fairly strong. Union density is moderate, although much higher
in Belgium (2017: 53%) than in the other countries. The main level of
bargaining is sectoral and the levels of industrial conflict are relatively
low, among other things because of the cooperative social partnership
approach. There is also a tradition of religiously based organizations.
Employee representation is typically organized in a dual system including
both union representation and work councils.
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The Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden—are in contrast to Central/Eastern Europe rather homogenous
in their industrial relations systems (e.g., Jochem 2011; Visser et al.
2009). Their industrial relations regime is labelled organized corporatism,
characterized by strong employer organizations and unions negotiating
collective agreements with a high degree of autonomy from the state and
with high coverage. The national confederations are largely organized
on the basis of social class, as opposed to the ideological and religious
divisions in some other parts of Europe. The autonomy of bargaining
and the strength of unions have created a need for them to take respon-
sibility for the functioning of the labour markets. With the help of state
mediation and conflict resolution, the level of open conflict between
the partners has been kept relatively low. Despite their autonomy, the
Nordic unions have since long comparatively strong influence on gov-
ernment policies, because of their organizational strength and historical
connection to social democratic parties and governments. They also
have quite well coordinated organizations through their single-channel
representation from company to national confederate levels, but with
collective bargaining centred at the sectoral level.
In the Southern part of Europe, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain are said to make up a polarized/state-centred regime of industrial
relations (Bieler and Schulten 2008; Visser et al. 2009). This regime is
based on traditions of conflict between employer organizations and trade
unions. It entails a more fragmented union movement divided accord-
ing to political and religious differences. Other features are relatively
weak coordination between different levels of bargaining and rather low
union density. There is a variation in the principal level of bargaining
between countries and we find both single- and dual-channel representa-
tion. Southern European countries show more of politicized involvement
of the social partners and more frequent state intervention into the deter-
mination of wages and labour standards compared to the Nordic region
and Central/Western Europe. Strikes are seen as an important means of
political protest to influence the state to take action.
Western European countries—the United Kingdom and Ireland—are
categorized as belonging to a liberal pluralist regime, to which also Malta
and Cyprus are sometimes added (Bieler and Schulten 2008; Visser et al.
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2009). This regime is characterized by lower degrees of state intervention
in industrial relations and less of legally established standard provisions
than the Southern European, Nordic and Central/Eastern European
regimes. Unions’ involvement in policy-making is more ad hoc in
nature. Collective agreement coverage is relatively low, even though
union density is moderate compared to European overall levels. Trade
union coordination is more fragmented than in the Nordic and Cen-
tral/Western European regions, which is linked to the fact that collective
bargaining is more decentralized, with company bargaining as typical.
Sectoral Comparisons across Europe
As hinted above, regime typologies can be criticized for hiding some vari-
ation between the countries clustered together (Gumbrell-McCormick
and Hyman 2013: 8–28; Lehndorff et al. 2017). The Nordic regime
appears to be the most homogenous, whereas Central/Eastern Europe is
a quite heterogeneous region. Another aspect is the variation in industrial
relations within each of the countries. There can actually be more diver-
sity in industrial relations across sectors within a country than within sec-
tors in the EU (Bechter et al. 2012). From this point of view, it has been
suggested that it is better to compare sectors than regimes. We may even
speak about sectoral regimes of industrial relations in Europe (Bechter
and Brandl 2015b).
The basis for a sectoral approach in the study of industrial relations
is that industries differ in many ways—for example, in terms of work
organization, production processes and market frameworks. The sectoral
(economic) context may thus influence industrial relations more strongly
than national (political) contexts (Bechter and Brandl 2015b). If also
taking into consideration that labour organizations in different sectors
may have diverging identities, resources and relations to employers, it is
likely that we can uncover effects on the engagement in European union
cooperation. Sector differences can also impact on the more specific bal-
ance regarding unions’ choices of which channels to work through and
of what strategies to pursue in relation to EU policies.
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With respect to sectoral differences we should note that some indus-
tries, particularly manufacturing, operate on highly integrated product
markets with high exposure to international competition. If their work
organization enables a high degree of production transferability, the trade
unions need to embark on transnational cooperation. More ‘sheltered’
industries—such as healthcare and education—are less exposed to inter-
national competition and have less opportunity for production reloca-
tion across borders (Bechter et al. 2012). Trade unions are then under
less external pressure to engage in transnational collaboration and have
developed it in weaker forms. The opposite applies to unions in sec-
tors under international competitive pressure; they are more likely to
be active in cross-border cooperation and lobbying than those in sectors
focused more on national markets (Bieler 2005; Gumbrell-McCormick
and Hyman 2013: 160).
Some reservations have to be added to this argument. Industries that
have undergone liberalization, such as civil aviation and telecommunica-
tions, and sectors that in other ways have been heavily affected by EU
policies have also had strong motives to collaborate across borders to try
to influence these policies (Müller et al. 2010). An example worth men-
tioning is the construction sector that has been greatly affected by the
posting of workers. Moreover, there are significant sectoral differences in
terms of union organization and resources. Trade unions in manufactur-
ing usually have a stronger organization and more resources nationally,
compared to unions in services and professional occupations.
European-Level Industrial Relations
The third way to approach industrial relations in Europe is to look
at the existence of European-level associations, interactions and institu-
tions, making up a relatively autonomous set-up of industrial relations
structures at supranational level (Marginson and Sisson 2004; Smismans
2012). To begin with the collective actors, consisting of employee and
employer associations and the state, we find a structure similar to that
at national level, with tripartite relations between these actors. There
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are also supranational relations between employers and workers in cross-
sectoral, sectoral and company-level organs. The European Commission,
the European Council and other EU institutions then make up the
actors taking the role of the state in the European setting. Social part-
ner organizations exist at both cross-industry and sectoral levels. On the
labour side, the main actor is the cross-industry ETUC and its sister
organization Eurocadres, which is a joint European association for pro-
fessionals and managers in both the private and the public sector. The
ETUC was established in 1973 from already existing trade union coop-
eration in the EEC and EFTA countries, aimed at both lobbying and
getting access to decision-making structures (Dølvik 1997: 134–150; cf.
Degryse and Tilly 2013). There are approximately 90 peak-level confed-
erations as members of the ETUC and, additionally, ten sector-based
European Trade Union Federations (ETUFs). Eurocadres was founded
in 1993 and has about 60 national trade unions and six of the ETUFs as
member organizations. The counterparts at cross-industry level are the
employer organizations BusinessEurope (previously called UNICE) with
roughly 40 national business federations as affiliates, CEEP representing
public sector employers, and SMEunited (previously called UEAPME)
with circa 70 national organizations representing small- and medium-
sized employers.
Moving on to the institutions and interactions, we find arenas for
bipartite negotiations and access points to EU policy-making for both
employer organizations and trade unions. These have been developed
over a long time and to some extent they mirror at least a minimal
set of industrial relations institutions at national level (Rhodes 2015).
The European-level social partners have a number of access points to
EU policy-making by being invited to consultations in various com-
mittees, for example the Economic and Social Committee, the Stand-
ing Committee on Employment, the Macroeconomic Dialogue, and the
European Semester. However, unions have quite limited power in these,
which have been said to be channels more for information and advice
than for influencing policy development (Welz 2008: 217–278).
There are also institutionalized arenas for bipartite dialogue between
employers and trade unions through the Social Dialogue at cross-industry
as well as sectoral levels. The European Social Dialogue (ESD) was
16 B. Furåker and B. Larsson
brought about in the mid-1980s to facilitate collective bargaining and
regulation at cross-industry level between the ETUC, on the one hand,
and BusinessEurope, CEEP and SMEunited, on the other. The idea was
that the social partners should be given possibilities to contribute to
European integration and to a strengthening of the EU’s social dimen-
sion (Tricart 2019). With the institutionalization of the ESD in 1987,
the social partners acquired the right of forming binding agreements
that could be converted into directives and they thus obtained a func-
tion as a corporatist, semi-legislative organ (Welz 2008). During its first
decade, the ESD at cross-industry level produced a few agreements that
were turned into directives, but not without pressure from the European
Commission (Welz 2008: 381–385). A second avenue was also instituted
through the right to produce autonomous bipartite agreements to be
implemented by the partners themselves rather than through directives.
In the late 1990s, with the European Commission taking a step back, the
ESD became mainly bipartite and autonomous and its regulatory effect
decreased (Welz 2008: 258–340; Rhodes 2015; Prosser 2016).
Table 1.2 gives some examples in which the social partners had an
indirect consultative role or direct involvement in producing impor-
tant regulations—and in the case of autonomous agreements also in
implementing them. The information in the table both provides further
information on the regulative pillars of European-level institutions and
illustrates some important interaction outcomes from these institutions.
Sectoral European-Level Industrial Relations
Just as at national level, we also have European trade union and employer
organizations at sectoral level. On its webpage concerning social dia-
logue, the European Commission lists 15 sectoral ETUFs.1 Like the
ETUC, the ETUFs—previously called European Industry Federations
(EIFs)—are meta-organizations , that is, they have organizations as mem-
bers (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008). The ETUF members are trade unions
below the peak level, organized from broad sectoral bases. Some of the
main ones are listed below:
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• European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW)
• European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism trade Unions
(EFFAT)
• European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU)
• European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE)
• European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF)
• European Trade Union Federation for Services and Communication
(UNI-Europa)
• IndustriALL Europe2
Table 1.2 Directives and agreements of cross-industry relevance
A) Directives from the ordinary legislative procedure
European Works Councils, 1994 (rev. 2009): Rules for EWCs in companies
operating in at least two European Economic Area countries
Posting of workers (PWD), 1996 (rev. 2018): Regulates remuneration for
posted workers, long-term posting and more
Working time, 2003: Regulates weekly working time, rest and leave, with
a maximum of 48 hours average weekly working time
Services, 2006: Facilitates trade in services between countries. Several
sectors exempt
Temporary Agency Work, 2008: Provides workers from employment
agencies similar conditions as regular employees
Enforcement of PWD, 2014: Aims at a better application of the PWD
B) Negotiated law (Directives from the ESD)
Parental leave, 1995 (rev. 2009): Gives parents the right to 4 months of
leave, of which 1 is non-transferable between parents
Part-time work, 1997: Prohibits discrimination of part-time workers
Fixed-term work, 1999: Prohibits discrimination of temporary employees
C) Autonomous agreements (from the ESD)
Telework, 2002: Regulates teleworkers conditions, health and safety and
collective rights
Work-related stress, 2004: Prescribes measures to prevent and manage
work-related stress
Harassment and violence, 2007: Prescribes measures to prevent and deal
with bullying, sexual harassment and violence
Inclusive labour markets, 2010: Prescribes measures for marginalized and
disadvantaged groups in the labour market
Active ageing, 2010: Aims to create good conditions for workers of all
ages
Sources European Commission webpage and Social Dialogue texts database
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In addition to these, there are also some sector-narrower ETUFs. The
employer side at sectoral level is more fragmented and the European
Commission lists more than 60 such meta-organizations. However, these
include both cross-national employer associations and organizations that
are more of business associations with national members based on indus-
try interest rather than on a status as employers.
Already before the ESD was instituted, some sectors had voluntary
social dialogues between the social partners at European level. In 1998,
the European Commission wanted to supplement the cross-industry
ESD and therefore reorganized the informal sectoral committees into
formally recognized and co-funded European Sectoral Social Dialogue
(ESSD) committees. These were provided with similar opportunities of
producing negotiated law and bipartite agreements as the cross-industry
ESD had been given in the 1980s (Degryse 2015; Keller and Weber
2011). Since their establishment, the number of ESSD committees
has expanded from around 20 to well over 40. They cover different
sectors and from their formation to the present, they have produced
over 900 documents co-signed by employers and unions. Yet, only
very few of these outcomes are autonomous agreements or negotiated
law (Table 1.3). The majority are lobbying statements, procedural
documents and soft instruments such as declarations, tools and recom-
mendations that have quite little effect at national level. Some of the
last attempts at producing negotiated law from the ESSDs have actually
been blocked politically, for example the agreements on health and
safety in hairdressing and on information and consultation rights for
government employees (Tricart 2019).
1 Why and How to Study Trade Union Cooperation in Europe? 19
Table 1.3 Directives and agreements of sectoral relevance
A) Negotiated law (Directives and [blocked Directives] from ESSD)
Working time of seafarers, 1999
Working time in civil aviation, 2000
Working conditions in railway cross-border services, 2004
Health and security on ships, 2008
Prevention from sharp injuries in hospitals and healthcare, 2009
[Health and safety in hairdressing, Agreement 2012/2016; no directive]
Working time in inland waterway transport, 2014
[Information and consultations rights in central government
administrations, Agreement 2015; no directive]
Working conditions in fishing, 2016
B) Autonomous agreements (from ESSD)
European license for (train) drivers, 2004
Health protection—good handling and use of crystalline silica, 2006
European hairdressing certificates, 2009
Minimum requirements for contracts in professional football, 2012
Sources European Commission webpage and Social Dialogue texts database
Data Collection Methods and Empirical
Materials
Empirically, this book is based on data collected during two major
research projects performed in the period 2009–2019. The first project,
CanTrade Unions within Europe Cooperate?, was headed by Bengt Furåker
and was funded by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social
Research (FAS 2008-0246). The second project, called Conditions for and
Obstacles to Trade Union Cooperation in Europe. A Comparative Study of
Countries and Sectors, was led by Bengt Larsson and received funding
from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ P13-0776:1). Besides ourselves,
our research team included Mattias Bengtsson, Kristina Lovén Seldén,
Patrik Vulkan and Anton Törnberg.
The data collected in these projects cover two surveys, a total of 46
interviews with 55 trade union officials from different countries, docu-
ments of various kinds and data from existing databases. It should also
be mentioned that one of the members of our research team was allowed
to participate in the ETUC Executive Committee’s meetings during a
period and could thus make direct observations. We begin by presenting
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the surveys and the interviews and end by saying a few words about the
documents and databases used.
Quantitative Materials
In both surveys, the aim was to study trade union positions, activities
and strategies, that is, the focus was on the organizational and not the
individual level. Since we only requested one questionnaire per union,
we targeted top-level representatives who could legitimately respond for
the whole organization. A majority of the respondents were secretaries-
general, presidents or vice presidents, and the rest of the respondents had
positions like international secretaries or other high-level officials. The
surveys were translated into several languages, and we used a mixed-mode
approach to improve the response rates. The first two waves of send-outs
were web-based and a third wave was postal (Fan and Yan 2010).
Survey 1 was distributed in 2010–2011 to all member organizations
of the ETUC—that is, the 85 national confederations and the 12 EIFs
(ETUFs) which were ETUC members at the time of the investigation.
Moreover, we included 499 trade unions below the peak level in 14
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom). The selection of unions in these countries was
grounded on an ambition to target unions with approximately 10,000
members or more. The total response rate was 42% (Table 1.4), but if




Number of unions in
send-out
Central/Eastern Europe 31 (20%) 157
Central/Western Europe 46 (49%) 93
Nordic region 102 (70%) 146
Southern Europe 35 (26%) 137
Western Europea 27 (53%) 51
EIFs/ETUFs 9 (75%) 12
Total 250 (42%) 596
aIncluding Cyprus and Malta (for details, see Larsson 2012)
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not counting France and Poland in which we had difficulties in select-
ing unions with at least 10,000 members—because of the fragmented
system with a large number of small unions—the response rate was over
70%. Besides some background matters regarding the size of union and
who was responding, survey 1 contained general questions about union
cooperation and two sets of questions specifically about wage and work-
ing time issues.
Survey 2 was distributed in 2015–2016 to 602 trade unions in
36 European countries. We directed it to unions in six main sectors
according to an established typology (Crouch 1999): mining (extractive),
metal, construction (productive/transformative), transport (distributive),
healthcare, and banking and finance (public and private services). This
strategic selection was designed to achieve large variation in aspects iden-
tified as important for sectoral union cooperation: production processes,
work organization, possibilities for relocation and exposure to interna-
tional competition. The overall response rate was 37%, with a total of
221 answers (Table 1.5). The sectors of mining and metals are merged
in our analyses, because many unions organized employees in both sec-
tors. Furthermore, an extra category of multisectoral unions was created
to gather unions organizing employees in more than one of the sectors.
In addition to asking about size and sector and who the respondent was,
survey 2 enclosed wide-ranging questions about union cooperation and
a set of questions specifically about wage issues.
Given the response rates on both surveys, a general note of caution as
regards the results is required. From our attempts to recruit interviewees




Number of unions in
send-out
Central/Eastern Europe 69 (27%) 255
Central/Western Europe 35 (39%) 89
Nordic region 73 (62%) 117
Southern Europe 35 (32%) 110
Western Europea 9 (18%) 51
Total 221 (37%) 602
aIncluding Cyprus and Malta (for details, see Larsson [2012] and Vulkan and
Larsson [2019], online supplementary material)
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(see below), we got the impression that the lesser the trade unions par-
ticipated in transnational cooperation, the less inclined they were to take
part in this research. Thus, both the survey and the interviews may be
biased in the sense that the level of cross-border collaboration shown is
higher than it is among the non-responding unions. Another problem is
the large differences in response rates across regions.
Qualitative Materials
In total, we conducted 46 interviews with 55 top-level or senior
officials in the two projects. The interviews were semi-structured and
lasted around 1–2 hours. They were done in person, via Skype or
telephone and in one case via e-mail. The conversations were recorded
and transcribed verbatim—except for two for which only a summary
was written, because the respondents did not want to be recorded or
quoted directly. We coded the interviews thematically using software for
qualitative analysis.
The first interview study included 17 interviews conducted in 2011–
2012 in connection with the first survey. These had a thematic orienta-
tion on wage issues, with some focus on minimum wages. Respondents
were chosen to represent different national views on the main topics:
Belgium (3 interviews), Germany (5), Latvia (1), Spain (3) and Sweden
(5). Ten of the interviewees represented cross-sectoral confederations and
seven represented sectoral or multisectoral trade unions (cf. Furåker and
Lovén Seldén 2013: 510–511).
The second interview study was done during 2015–2016, close to the
second survey. We conducted 29 interviews, with unions in healthcare
(8), construction (5), metal (5), banking and finance (5), and transport
(3). From recommendations by contacts in Central/Eastern Europe, we
also included one union confederation and one union each in education
and energy in that region. Our selection aimed to achieve a variation in
sectors and regions corresponding to the survey. The Nordic countries
were represented by Sweden (7) and a joint Nordic labour organization
(1); Central/Western Europe by Germany (4); Southern Europe by Italy
(5); Central/Eastern Europe by the Czech Republic (3), Hungary (3),
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Latvia (2) and Lithuania (1); and Western Europe by the United King-
dom (3) (cf. Larsson and Törnberg 2019: 7).
Besides the interviews, we also utilized documents and data from
other sources: We made use of European Commission documents, web-
pages and the Social Dialogue Texts Database to get information on
social dialogues and their outcomes. Another source of information
was the ICTWSS Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 55 coun-
tries between 1960 and 2017 (Visser 2019). We were also given access to
certain data from the ETUC, of which we primarily used the minutes of
the ETUC Executive Committee meetings (Furåker and Lovén Seldén
2016). It should be repeated that one member of the research team had




2. IndustriALL was established through a 2012 merger of the European
Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF), the European Mine, Chemical and
Energy Workers Federation (EMCEF) and the European Trade Union
Committee: Textile, Clothing and Leather (ETUC-TCL).
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Patterns of Transnational Trade Union
Cooperation in Europe
Abstract This chapter offers an overview of patterns of transnational
trade union cooperation—based on empirical data. It begins by provid-
ing a brief depiction of the multilevel structures of such cooperation, fol-
lowed by a presentation of the general views among unions regarding the
importance and the potential benefits of cooperating at different levels.
A second section entails a more detailed investigation of the importance
attributed to various topics to collaborate on. This part also includes an
examination of the preferences among unions in different sectors and
industrial relations regimes/regions regarding forms of cooperation. The
remainder of the chapter section scrutinizes what unions consider to be
the most important obstacles to and facilitators for cross-border cooper-
ation.
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Introduction
The existence of meta-organizations like the ETUC and the ETUFs,
treated in Chapter 1, obviously implies a great deal of cooperation
between trade unions in Europe. Even though labour organizations are
generally based on national affiliation, we see a long history of inter-
nationalism in the trade union movement through both supranational
organizations and bilateral contacts and actions (Gumbrell-McCormick
and Hyman 2013: 158–161; cf. Gajewska 2009; Seeliger 2019: 14–22).
An illustration of how transnational cooperation is highlighted as a joint
effort at European level comes from the ETUC action program 2019–
2023:
In recent years we—the ETUC and its affiliates—have significantly
strengthened our internal cooperation and coordination. We have agreed
on common policies by overcoming the existing differences between east
and west, north and south. We have created efficient networks and prac-
tices within the ETUC to involve and mobilise our affiliates. We have sig-
nificantly increased our influence on institutions, at both EU and national
level. (ETUC 2019: 8)
Naturally, the level of international activities among the national mem-
bers of the ETUC and the ETUFs or between trade unions below these
peak-level confederations varies across countries and sectors as well as
with organizational resources. Some large organizations are active not
only in exchange with and support to sister organizations in other coun-
tries but are also central drivers and actors on different topics. However,
even unions with very small resources and less international activity may
actually have strong latent networks of contacts, which can be used when
needed—as demonstrated by this quotation from a Baltic interviewee:
[With some] countries, our cooperation is only a few e-mails [from] time
to time, when there is a need… We have more or less at least one person
in every country [to whom] we can write or phone to ask some questions.
But, the reality is that, like every trade union, we are very busy at the
national level, so there are not a lot of international questions we are
involved in.
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In our two surveys to trade unions, a majority confirmed the general
importance of pursuing transnational union cooperation. In survey 1,
almost all responding unions (94%) agreed with a statement that cross-
national union cooperation will, in the long run, improve conditions for
European workers (Larsson 2014). In survey 2, the financial and eco-
nomic crisis starting in 2008 was said to have had negative effects on
transnational cooperation. Over 60% stated that the crisis had made the
outlooks of unions more protectionist, thereby substantiating discussions
pointing to a ‘renationalization’ of attitudes during the last decade or so
(Lehndorff et al. 2017: 30). Despite this, 70% of the responding unions
reported that they had actually increased cooperation with other unions
in Europe because of the crisis. In addition, over 40% of the respondents
declared that their organization desired even more transnational cooper-
ation in the future (Bengtsson and Vulkan 2018).
In order to unpack such overall ambitions to cooperate for the purpose
of improving the conditions for European workers, we need to examine
what cooperation between unions really is and what conditions that hin-
der or facilitate it. In the next section, we begin by introducing a theo-
retical typology of different collaborative structures and then look at the
existing levels of collaboration and how important these are according
to the trade unions themselves. Thereafter we focus on the general top-
ics that unions cooperate on and which forms the organizations prefer.
The final part of the chapter elaborates the issue of what factors make up
important obstacles and facilitators for cooperation.
Multilevel Structures of Cooperation
Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish at least four kinds of coop-
erative structures signifying different degrees of institutionalization (cf.
Müller and Platzer 2017: 294; Müller et al. 2010). (1) The least insti-
tutionalized structure consists of bi- or multilateral communication net-
works. Through such networks, national unions can use information
from other unions in developing their national or European-level strate-
gies, while still acting independently of others. (2) At the next level,
national organizations work jointly to identify common interests and
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form loose coordination networks. This enables them to synchronize their
individual actions across countries or at supranational level, for example
by matching national collective bargaining or positions to be taken in the
ESD, while even then acting autonomously. (3) A still stronger degree of
institutionalization is the development of joint activities on a case-by-
case basis in cooperation networks. Examples of such cooperation can be
activities like seminars, training or demonstrations, comprising unions
from more than one country. (4) The most institutionalized coopera-
tive structure exists when trade unions together form supranational and
staffed meta-organizations , that is, with other organizations as members
and with a decision-making assembly or a mandate to act on behalf of its
affiliates or concert their actions on a more long-term basis (Ahrne and
Brunsson 2008). The ETUC and the ETUFs are the main examples at
European level.
All of these forms of cooperation exist in Europe and they are only sep-
arable analytically. In practice, they are intertwined, since ‘joint efforts to
build formalized supranational structures for coordination contribute to
creating corresponding informal structures (e.g., trust) as a by-product’
(Traxler and Mermet 2003: 237). As a consequence, bi- or multilat-
eral communication networks and concerted collaboration through the
ETUC and the ETUFs mutually reinforce each other. In that way,
top-down and bottom-up processes of cooperation and coordination
blend in a multilevel structure (Marginson and Sisson 2004; Keune and
Marginson 2013). According to this line of argument, the more concer-
tation there is of action, the stronger the networks of bilateral exchange
and informal coordination from below tend to become.
Transnational trade union cooperation simultaneously takes place at
various organizational levels and in various regional contexts. From our
interviews, we see that unions are active at different levels, from the local
to the global. Whereas in small organizations the same individuals may
have to be implicated in almost everything, in larger unions there can
be an internal division of labour. However, in the practical work around
specific topics, the different levels tend to be interwoven also in larger
organizations, as shown in this quote from a Swedish union representa-
tive:
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For us, it is not like ‘now we work on European issues’ or ‘now we work
on global issues’… There are several arenas: there is a local, a regional,
a national, and there is a European and a global arena. We should be
present everywhere—they are all entangled.
By creating a generalized map of a single Swedish trade union’s relations
to other organizations—both directly to other counterparts and to meta-
organizations—it is possible to illustrate the complexity of the multilevel
structure of cooperation (Fig. 2.1). The actually existing structures of
course vary between countries, sectors and individual unions; the ratio-
nale for departing from a Swedish union is that we want to include
regional cross-country organizations in the map and those are well devel-
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Fig. 2.1 Generalized map of a trade union cooperation structure.
Note GUF = Global Union Federation; GWC = Global Works Council; ITUC =
International Trade Union Confederation; SE = Sweden; TU = trade union
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Figure 2.1 should be read as follows: The individual union that is the
starting point for the structure is placed at the bottom. Thin lines indi-
cate direct bilateral cooperation with other unions within or outside its
sector, in- or outside its own country. They refer to everything from more
sporadic information exchange or joint action to regular training or sup-
port activities. Bold lines signify that the union have representatives in
and/or is a member of another organization. Bold dashed lines illustrate
similar relationships between these other organizations.
Presented from the left to the right, the structure in Fig. 2.1 demon-
strates that, at company level, the focal trade union may be involved in
local representation and cooperation with other national unions repre-
sented in the workplace. Similar cooperation at European and global
level can also exist in the form of EWCs in multinational companies
having employees in at least two European countries. This may include
collaborating in connection with information and consultation processes,
contract negotiations with employers and even joint strikes (Banyuls
et al. 2008; Müller et al. 2013). A corresponding global-level structure
is still very uncommon, although there are some global corporate boards
such as Global Works Councils and other similar arrangements (Steiert
2009). The bilateral level refers to direct cooperation with other unions
within or outside the country and it is usually less formally organized.
At sectoral level, there may be joint organizations at national level—in
Sweden often in the form of union bargaining cartels. In the Nordic
region, there are also sectoral Nordic trade union federations. To some
extent, these mirror the European-level ETUFs, which have a coordinat-
ing role in the 43 ESSD committees. The ETUFs are normally linked to
Global Sectoral Federations (GUFs), in some cases as independent subdi-
visions of the latter. Finally, at cross-industry level, there are both national,
Nordic, European and global confederations. It can be mentioned that
the three national peak-level confederations in Sweden are members of
the Council of Nordic Trade Unions, the ETUC and its global counter-
part International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).
The focus of this study is primarily the collaboration at European level
in and between the organizations that are in bold in Fig. 2.1. However,
from time to time relationships outside of this structure enter as impor-
tant in the analysis, which is why they are presented in this overview.
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We now first examine union views on cooperation within their Euro-
pean meta-organizations (the ETUC and the ETUFs) and then turn to
the communication and coordination networks built upon direct bi- and
multilateral contacts between national trade unions.
Cooperation within Meta-organizations
Meta-organizations are said to have particular difficulties, because they
have other organizations as members (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008;
Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 158–161). One of the main
tensions and balance acts is that between meta-organizational authority
and members’ autonomy—in relation to the question of shared iden-
tity. In the case of the ETUC, it appears that these issues have been
persistent. Nordic and Western European member organizations empha-
size autonomy to a greater extent and show doubts to give the ETUC a
strong mandate than do Southern and Central/Western European trade
unions. This is based on the national traditions of the former, but also
on their greater Euroscepticism and reluctance to develop supranational
wage policies and regulations (Busemeyer et al., 2008; Dølvik 1997:
162–171, 243–289, 308–309, 392–394; Glassner and Vandaele 2012).
Another tension is that between adhering to the ‘logic of influence’ and
leaning towards the ‘logic of membership’. It is a matter of the strategic
readiness to adjust to the institutional set-up of the EU to become influ-
ential as opposed to the attraction to rely on bottom-up democracy and
legitimacy, that is, what members perceive as important (Hyman 2005;
Erne 2008).
When asked about these issues in survey 1, around 80% of the orga-
nizations agreed (to some or a high degree) with the need for the ETUC
both to increase efforts to mobilize and pursue the interests of its mem-
ber organizations and to adapt its methods to the actual decision-making
in the EU (Larsson 2014). In other words, this can be interpreted as an
appreciation of both the bottom-up logic of membership and the top-
down logic of influence. As disclosed in a national-level study, Swedish
trade union members had lower expectations on European union coop-
eration to improve the situation for workers than did the organizations’
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top-level representatives (Furåker and Bengtsson 2013). Whereas very
few of the latter saw any reasons to engage less in issues at European
level, 40–50% of their members believed it would be a good idea to do so
and instead increase direct efforts to improve working conditions nation-
ally. The tension between a logic of influence and a logic of membership
thereby does not merely relate to how the ETUC should function, but
also to whether unions should put a lot of effort into such transnational
work at all.
As regards meta-organizational authority versus member organiza-
tions’ autonomy, our survey confirmed continuity in the above varia-
tions between different regions/industrial relations regimes in Europe.
We pushed the issues to their edge by asking respondents to react to
the statement ‘To increase their power and influence, the ETUC mem-
ber organizations must be prepared to transfer authority to the ETUC’.
The results in Table 2.1 reveal that besides the ETUFs, trade unions in
Central/Eastern Europe more than others believed in such a strategy to
enhance influence, whereas the unions in Western European countries
and the Nordic region were the ones most strongly underlining auton-
omy for members’ unions. The first column of figures is a summary indi-
cator, showing in what direction unions in each regime/region lean. It is
simply the sum of the numbers in columns A and B minus the corre-
sponding sum for columns C and D.
The ETUC is only one meta-organization at European level, and there
has been much effort put into the cooperation through the sectoral
ETUFs and the ESSDs since around the turn of the millennium. There-
fore, in survey 2, we asked representatives for unions at sectoral level
about the importance of collaboration through meta-organizations (from
national confederations to global confederations). Table 2.2 presents the
outcomes on whether it had become more or less important for the
responding union in the past ten years to cooperate through differ-
ent types of organizations. The balance score indicates the extent to
which the importance of a specific meta-organization has increased or
decreased.
There was a general tendency that trade union meta-organizations,
federations and confederations at both national and supranational level
were perceived to have become more important for union cooperation
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during the ten years before 2015–2016. Only a few stated that there
had been a decrease in the significance of any of the meta-organizations
mentioned and, with the exception for the ITUC, the balance scores are
strongly positive. The ETUFs show the largest increase during this 10-
year period. Over half (57%) of the unions declared that the ETUFs had
become more important, which is a higher proportion than the increase
in importance of their own national trade union confederation (47%),
the GUFs (47%), the ETUC (33%) and the ITUC (22%).
Even though all listed meta-organizations seem to have become more
important over time, sectoral-level cooperation turned out to have
increased the most. In addition to the figures in Table 2.2, 74% of the
responding unions affirmed that for the future their organization would
prefer to have more transnational cooperation in their own sector rather
than more cooperation with unions in other sectors in their own country.
These results should be interpreted with some caution, though, since
they are based on responses from unions below the peak level only, and
since non-respondents may include disproportionately large numbers of
unions with little interest in European cooperation. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to overlook that data are in line with the institutional develop-
ment at European level discussed in Chapter 1—that the sectoral level
has been attributed greater importance by the European Commission
since 1998, when a reform was carried out to strengthen and advance
negotiations between unions and employers within the framework of
ESSD committees (Rhodes 2015; cf. Degryse 2015; Prosser 2016).
To understand better in what ways the ETUFs have increased in
importance, it is necessary to distinguish some of their main func-
tions. Schematically, union cooperation through the meta-organizations
of both the ETUC and the ETUFs can be said to have three main pur-
poses: (1) to coordinate national strategies through exchanges of informa-
tion, arrangements of training, and coordination of trade union action;
(2) to influence EU policies and legislation through lobbying and con-
sultation in various committees and organs; and (3) to deliver common
statements and agreements through social dialogues and negotiations
with European employer organizations, both at cross-sectoral and indus-
try level. Coordination, lobbying and negotiations actually exist simulta-
neously within the social dialogues.
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In survey 2, we listed a number of statements on the ESSD and asked
respondents to indicate to what extent they agreed. Since it requires quite
some resources to take part in such joint work at European level, we
included a couple of items on whether respondents thought that such
collaboration really benefited the interests of their members and workers
in general and whether they hesitated to participate because of the costs
in time and resources (Table 2.3).
As shown in Table 2.3, there was strong recognition from the surveyed
trade unions that the ESSD is important, not only to negotiate with
employer organizations, but also to influence the European Commission
and, especially, to strengthen transnational union cooperation. It was also
commonly seen as crucial to meet the interests of members nationally.
On all of these statements, not far from 80% up to nearly 90% of the
responding unions agreed to some or a high degree and hence we find
high summary indicators. As noted in Chapter 1, most of the outcomes
of the ESSDs are non-binding declarations, joint statements, procedural
documents or soft guidelines. Against that background, it might per-
haps be surprising that about 77% of the unions agreed to some or a
high degree in that the ESSD has a crucial role to meet the interests of
workers and more than 50% did the same regarding whether it had had
great significance for the employment and working conditions of their
members. On the latter statement, however, the proportion being hesi-
tant was substantial. There was even more scepticism regarding whether
the dialogues actually deliver in relation to the efforts put in. 37% of the
respondents leaned towards doubting whether it was in fact worth the
effort, given the time and resources required to take part in meetings,
committees and working groups related to the ESSD. Still, the summary
indicator is negative (note that the statement goes in the opposite direc-
tion compared to the others in the table).
The last thing to consider as concerns the transnational meta-
organizations in Europe is that there exists an additional level based
on supranational organizations in some regions. These are very varied,
and the strongest institutionalized form of cooperation—that is, joint
formal and staffed meta-organizations at both sectoral and cross-sectoral
levels—is present as far as we know only in the Nordic countries.1 More-
over, the Nordic confederations have relations with the Baltic States,
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whose federations may exchange observers at meetings. There is also
cooperation through the Baltic Organizing Academy and the Baltic Sea
Trade Union Network. The cooperation is rather unilateral, consisting of
targeted support given from Nordic to Baltic unions. These asymmetric
relationships have a long tradition, but we find a certain resignation
among the Nordic respondents concerning the changes in the Baltics.
The development was said to be very slow and to yield quite meagre
results in terms of member recruitment and organizational capacities.
Overall, the differences in the Nordic unions’ bilateral relations with
‘core’ countries in Central/Western and Western Europe and with the
Baltic States respectively show the importance of organizational strength
among cooperating partners. With weak partners, the relationship
becomes asymmetrical and unidirectional in the flow of information
and resources and thereby less useful compared to collaboration with
stronger unions in Central/Western and Western Europe.
Networks of Bi- and Multilateral Cooperation
Besides the meta-organizations in Europe, there are also less formalized
and institutionalized cooperation structures. These often take the form
of direct bi- or multilateral communication and coordination networks
between national unions. From the theoretical assumptions, the existence
of formal Nordic meta-organizations may be seen as both being based
on and further facilitating informal collaboration in the region. A par-
ticular feature of the Nordic cooperation seems to be its high internal
synchronization compared to other areas in Europe. Through their rel-
atively strong cultural community and similarities in traditions, Nordic
trade unions have built a strong foundation of trust, which allows them
a rapid response from each other when wanted, for example to obtain
information or to provide support through solidarity action.
The strong Nordic coordination makes unions well-prepared for meet-
ings in the ETUC and the ETUFs, in which they often speak with one
voice (Seeliger 2019: 111–112, 169–170). When working as a coalition
through the Council of Nordic Trade Unions, in relation to the ETUC
they were—at least some years ago—the third largest formally organized
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and staffed coalition of national unions after the British Trade Union
Confederation and the German DGB Confederation (Degryse and Tilly
2013: 73). The Nordic meta-organizations also facilitate direct, bilateral
cooperation from below and have a brokerage function in collaboration
with other important European trade unions. From our interviews, it
seems that this mediation is most developed in the metal sector; a quote
from a union representative from Sweden gives a picture of this:
[Our Nordic Sector Federation] has a formal arrangement with the Ger-
mans, in that our chairmen … meet the leaders of the German federa-
tions… We have meetings… at… international secretary level, with the
British [and] with the French. Not so much [with] the Spanish yet, and
not so much [with] Italians, but on and off … [with Eastern Europe]
it is also a bit more ad hoc, and happens especially in connection with
meetings [in] IndustriAll Europe.
In many regions in Europe, there are of course loose bilateral and
multilateral communication and coordination networks, through which
unions exchange information for use at national level. To some extent,
these networks are connected to the ETUFs, in the form of organized
sub-groupings based on geographical proximity. This is not always the
case, though, and hence such regional networks have varying levels of
organization and strength. An Italian representative of a union in the
construction sector offered the following depiction:
Europe is more or less divided in areas: We have the Nordic part; the
Nordic federation in the EFBWW… Then we have a predominant area,
in the centre of Europe—I mean Germany, Austria, and Switzerland…
and, some years ago, maybe nine, ten years, we established a sort of coor-
dination group within the Southern Europe area. It is composed of Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Belgium—who wants to be with us. We meet regu-
larly five, six times per year and, yeah, we have a sort of coordination.
To this listing of more or less organized networks, a Czech unionist added
the extended Visegrad group, including unions from Germany, Poland,
Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic and with interest
from Swiss unions to take part: ‘All representatives from this group meet
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once a year at least, and we inform each other about trade union activ-
ities in these countries and discuss different topics within our sectors’.
Compared to the more organized metal sector, the international network
structures in the other sectors studied seem to have been built very much
from below, albeit in relation to the ETUF structures. An Italian repre-
sentative of a union in the hospital sector gave an example of this, talking
about an informal alliance in Southern Europe:
We have a… Mediterranean group. This is a self-organized network by
the trade unions in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and France. Not part of
the group but part of its work [are] Cyprus, Malta, and Israel… I say it
is self-organized because the meetings are paid for by the trade unions…
We work together in terms of web-networking or meeting once a year.
We exchange all the information that we need on all the sectors [within
EPSU].
This regional clustering of networks has been confirmed in our quanti-
tative and social network analyses (Larsson and Törnberg 2019; Vulkan
and Larsson 2019). In survey 2, respondents were asked about the 3–
5 most important regular cooperation partners. The analyses disclosed
that such networks tended to be concentrated in their own sector. The
reason is a combination of from-below interest coordination and from-
above organization, founded on shared sectoral interests (Bechter et al.
2012). In addition, the ESSDs and the ETUFs function as both multi-
cooperation arenas for making contacts and building trust for direct
inter-organizational networking.
From comparisons based on the regime typology in Chapter 1, we
identified a significant tendency that bilateral union cooperation was
focused on partners within the same geographical region. This confirms
the patterns revealed both in qualitative research of trade union network-
ing (Gollbach and Schulten 2000; Magnusson and Murhem 2009; Mar-
ginson and Sisson 2004: 112–113) and in Nordin’s (2009) quantitative
studies of the metal sector. The explanation is of course that countries
within the same region are neighbours, with geographical proximity and
sometimes common borders. Also institutional similarities and differ-
ences, as discussed in Chapter 1, play a role. It is obvious that industrial
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relations institutions (Visser et al. 2009), economic and political contexts
and challenges (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013), trade union
resources (Lehndorff et al. 2017) and cultural aspects such as language,
traditions, and ideology (Hyman 2001) vary with regions in Europe.
As regards regional variation, a recurrent feature in the sectors
studied—metal, transport, construction, healthcare and banking and
finance—is that the Central/Western European unions tended to clus-
ter in the core of networks, whereas unions from the other regions usu-
ally gathered more peripherally—as offshoots from the central core. We
could also conclude that German unions occupied the central position in
all sectors, not only in cross-border bargaining networks in the metal sec-
tor as has been shown previously but in transnational cooperation more
generally (Nordin 2009; Traxler et al. 2008: 222; cf. Seeliger 2019: 172–
174). German unions were the main brokers between the more periph-
eral clusters, even though there were also some secondary brokers from
other large countries in Europe.
When examining network ties, we found some differences and similar-
ities between the regimes/regions in their balance of intra- versus interre-
gional networking. The results of the analysis of whether a union (source)
mentioned another union (target) as cooperation partner are presented in
Table 2.4. As can be seen, the Nordic unions were quite intra-regionally
focused, with a strong majority of their cooperation relations going to
other Nordic unions. The Southern European labour organizations also
had quite a strong tendency towards such an intra-regional concentra-
tion, whereas in Central/Western and Central/Eastern Europe there was
a more equal balance in the selection of partners, with a greater share of
cooperation links stretching out to other regions.
Looking at these results from a historical development perspective,
we discover both path dependency and change. The intra-regional focus
among the Nordic unions relates to their history of strong internal
cooperation and possibly to their history of being somewhat reluctant
Europeans as well (Seeliger 2019: 211, 226; cf. Larsson 2014, 2015).
The Central/Eastern and Southern European clusters have developed
more slowly and later. In the former case this was linked to the EU’s
enlargement to the East; the trade unions there are more fragmented
and have a tendency to be more dependent on unions outside their
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own region (Léonard et al. 2012; Seeliger 2019: 211–212). The Cen-
tral/Western European labour organizations early developed cooperative
networks in border regions. They cluster in the core of the sector net-
works and they are number one concerning links to other regional clus-
ters. The explanation is partly their resources and influential position in
Europe. Another factor is that cooperation networks tend to concentrate
around border regions and Central/Western European countries, taken
together, border all other regions in Europe (Gollbach and Schulten
2000; Traxler et al. 2008).
Our social network analysis confirms previous research indicating that
cooperation density is especially high within the metal sector (Glassner
and Pusch 2013; Magnusson and Murhem 2009). The construction sec-
tor is highly integrated as well, whereas transport and healthcare have
lower levels of direct transnational networking. The results found in the
latter sectors have to do with the greater fragmentation in terms of occu-
pational or sub-sectoral unions, leading to more isolated cliques in the
network.
Forms of Cooperation
The presentation above is very much focused on trade unions’ general
views on cooperation and the multilevel structures through which coop-
eration is pursued. We now turn to the more concrete forms of collabora-
tion that unions have been engaged in—from producing joint statements
to concerting common actions such as demonstrations or strikes across
countries.
Through the ETUC and the ETUFs and the social dialogues coordi-
nated via these meta-organizations, unions produce a great number of
resolutions, positions, petitions, open letters, etc. Some are joint state-
ments with employer organizations on employment relations and politi-
cal and economic developments in Europe. The ETUC and the ETUFs
also coordinate exchange of information, for example on collective bar-
gaining and union actions across countries. In the period before our sur-
veys were conducted, the ETUC organized European demonstrations,
both in specific cities and coordinated across different cities (Degryse
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and Tilly 2013). In 2012, the organization even mobilized simultaneous
strikes in four countries—Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain—as a protest
against the austerity measures following the economic and financial crisis
in Europe. This was however something of an exception, because strikes
are generally dealt with as national matters. As for the ETUFs, we can
observe quite similar palettes of activities, varying between sectors. At the
level further below, we find a great variety of bi- and multilateral actions,
for example exchange of information or observers in collective bargain-
ing, cooperation around training programmes, negotiations about plant
restructuring, participation in demonstrations and sympathy strikes.
To get an overview of trade unions’ involvement in joint activities, we
questioned respondents in both surveys about these things (Furåker and
Bengtsson 2013). The results in survey 1 showed that most of the labour
organizations (92%) exchanged information on collective agreements,
either on a regular or a more sporadic basis. Over two-thirds (71%) of
them collaborated on training programmes for union officials. More
than half of the unions (52%) engaged in coordinating negotiations on
plant restructuring and closures—regarding issues such as redundancies,
wages and training—and more than a third (38%) exchanged observers
or negotiators in collective bargaining.
Transnational action can be coordinated either through the European
meta-organizations—the ETUC and the ETUFs—or in the coopera-
tion structures existing globally above these, or regionally below them.
Table 2.5 shows the responding unions’ participation in actions of
transnational kind as organized by the ETUC, the ETUFs and other
bodies during the last three years. It also tells us something about the bal-
ance between softer and more contentious forms of action. The majority
(80%) had participated in writing statements, petitions and open letters.
Slightly over half (56%) of them had been involved in demonstrations
and boycotts across borders and almost a fifth of the organizations stated
that they had taken part in more contentious forms of action such as
overtime bans, strikes or blockades with cross-border reach.
Since the greatest variation emerged in the demonstration and boy-
cotts category, we carried out a more detailed analysis of it, showing quite
large regional and sector differences (Larsson 2014). The main results
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were that the Central/Western and Southern European unions had much
higher degrees of participation in transnational demonstrations and boy-
cotts than unions from the other regions, and the Nordic organizations
had the lowest level of participation. Cross-sectoral peak-level confed-
erations turned out to have more cooperation than all sectoral trade
unions, with the exception of transport that obviously had organized
several activities across borders during the three-year period before the
survey was conducted in 2011–2012. When examining the role of size—
which was used as a proxy for resources—large organizations quite unsur-
prisingly showed more participation in cross-border demonstrations and
boycotts than smaller ones.
We also performed a similar analysis of the trade unions’ views on the
importance to engage more in cross-national demonstrations, boycotts,
overtime bans and strikes in the future (Larsson 2014). This revealed
that peak-level confederations were particularly inclined to have more
of these things in the future, as were unions from Central/Western and
Southern Europe compared to unions from Central/Eastern Europe and
the Nordic countries. This suggests that differences in national-level
industrial relations traditions affect the way cross-national activities are
approached.
In order to get a deeper understanding of these activities at sectoral
level, we had a similar question in survey 2, while extending the period
to five years and also examining the extent to which such cooperation
had taken place at national level. The purpose was to explore the balance
between national and international cooperation. The results are shown in
Table 2.6 and for comparative reasons we add a column with the corre-
sponding results from survey 1 in which peak-level confederations were
included.
Some main points can be drawn attention to from these results. Sec-
toral unions had had a great deal of cooperation with other unions in
their own countries, but we also find high figures for cooperation with
unions abroad in the same sector. Both more contentious forms of action
such as boycotts and strikes and coordination of collective bargaining
remained highly nation-based activities. Softer activities—like exchange
of information on collective bargaining, authoring joint statements, peti-
tions or open letters and organizing training—were more transnational.
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In addition, the second survey suggests that sectoral trade unions had
somewhat lower degrees of cooperation than peak-level confederations,
which can be seen in that the numbers in the second column of figures
are mostly lower than those from survey 1 in the last column. It is also
worth noting that, if ranked, the levels of transnational cooperation in
the two forms mentioned are consistent across the two surveys.
As there was quite great variation in the extent to which unions coop-
erated transnationally, we created an index of all the relevant forms to
measure the overall level of cooperation. This aimed at studying whether
regime and sector differences and the resources of a union (i.e., size)
could explain the patterns (Vulkan and Larsson 2019). The regression
results (not shown) indicated that the size of organizations was strongly
significant: the larger the union, the more of transnational cooperation.
We did not find any markedly strong differences across industrial rela-
tions regimes/regions, but some significant sectoral dissimilarity became
visible. Labour organizations in the services industry were, on average,
less engaged in various forms of cooperation than those in other sectors.
Unions in the metal sector were involved in most forms of cooperation,
and unions in transport and construction as well as trans-sectoral unions
had an intermediate position.
Channels for Influencing EU Policies
One important reason for trade unions to cooperate transnationally in
Europe is their interest in influencing the development of EU policies
and regulations. In Chapter 1, we identified the different access points
in this respect through social dialogues, consultations in various com-
mittees and fora and joint lobbying. Besides these channels there are
national routes as well to influence the EU. Unions may, for example,
lobby their own national members of the European parliament and they
may try to have some bearing on their own government’s position in
the Council or other fora to impact on policy development (Clauwaert
2011; Greenwood 2007: 127–130; cf. Larsson 2015).
When, in survey 1, asked about whom their trade union cooperated
with to influence EU policies, it turned out that the national route was
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very important for unions. 75% of the responding unions stated that
they collaborated to some or to a high degree with national authori-
ties and political parties to achieve this kind of influence (Table 2.7).
In contrast, the least important route was other NGOs or networks,
with only 34% of the labour organizations indicating that they coop-
erated with these to the same degree. The ETUFs, the trade unions’ own
Brussels offices, the ETUC, various cross-national regional networks and
members of political groups in the European parliament were on average
ranked in between.
To understand the variation in how trade unions cooperate to affect
EU policies and what channels they use to do that, we elaborated the
analysis somewhat further. We created an index of the overall usage
of different channels, by adding the seven items in Table 2.7, and
run regressions with industrial relations regimes/regions, sectors and
size of the organization as independent variables to explain differences
(Larsson 2015). The results confirmed that there was more cooperation
to influence the EU among larger unions than among smaller ones.
Additionally, collaboration was somewhat less in services than in manu-
facturing, transport and construction and it was highest among the peak
confederations. In terms of regimes or regions, the Central/Western
European unions had the highest levels of overall cooperation. The
Western and Central/Eastern European labour organizations had the
lowest levels, while the Nordic and the Southern European unions
appeared in a middle position.
Furthermore, we examined the balance between what we catego-
rized as ‘own channels’ and ‘cooperative channels’ to affect EU policies.
The former is defined as trade unions’ cooperation through their own
national government, political parties or the national Brussels offices and
the latter category means cooperation within the ETUC and the ETUFs.
As shown in Fig. 2.2, we placed the zero point (intercept) in the balance
score at 0.3, which was the mean of the total. This indicates a slight
overall tendency that unions collaborated more through their own chan-
nels (positive numbers in balance score) than through the cooperative
channels (negative numbers).
Central/Western European unions can be said to make up sort of a
benchmark for the others: they not only had the highest degree of coop-
eration to influence EU policies, but also deviated the least from the













































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2.2 Balance scoresa on own channels vs. cooperative channels, by region
(n = 209–228)
aBalance scores range from 1 to –1. They are based on the means on the first
four items in Table 2.7 (National authorities or political parties + Trade union
offices in Brussels) – (ETUFs + ETUC). ‘Do not know’ is recoded as missing
Source Own data, survey 1
overall balance between collaboration through their own channels and
the cooperative channels through the ETUC and the ETUFs. In com-
parison, we see that the Nordic unions tended to orient themselves more
to the first alternative than to the second, whereas the Southern (in par-
ticular) and the Central Eastern European unions had the contrary ten-
dency to emphasize cooperation through the meta-organizations.
Focus and Topics of Cooperation
The analyses above make clear that some of the differences in the forms
and intensity of cooperation are related to differences in industrial rela-
tions regimes/regions, sectors and organizational resources. However,
trade unions also face quite varying challenges because of specific polit-
ical and economic developments at both national and sectoral/industry
level (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 37–46). Thus, they can-
not be expected to be interested or engaged in cooperation around the
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same general issues or topics. We bring up a couple of examples of this in
the case studies following in Chapters 3 and 4, but already in the current
section we give a brief overview of what topics and issues that unions
in different sectors and countries considered important to collaborate on
nationally and transnationally.
In survey 2, we questioned the union representatives about both their
existing cooperation on a number of different issues and how important
they found them to be for the future. Before going into the details, we
can note that the overall results in Table 2.8 verify some of the findings
presented above. There was a higher prevalence of national compared
with transnational collaboration and most of the latter was focused on
trade unions in the same sector. The outcomes also confirm that most
unions were engaged in some cooperation, either national or transna-
tional (Vulkan and Larsson 2019).
By looking at the differences between the levels of existing coopera-
tion with other unions in their own country and cooperation with for-
eign unions in the same sector, we discover some broad tendencies in
Table 2.8. Wages were not surprisingly a very nationally based issue. The
topics of unemployment/employment, working time, and employment
protection legislation had a similar tendency to be nationally oriented,
but to a lesser extent. In contrast, migration and recruitment of members
tended to be similarly strong in transnational cooperation. At the same
time, these are topics on which approximately 30–40% of the respond-
ing unions indicated no cooperation at all.
Regarding how important the topics were believed to be for future
transnational cooperation (column on the far right), the results indicate
that topics on which unions already cooperated were seen as the most
important. Still, there are some exceptions to this. When comparing how
high the different issues were ranked (in percentages and means), we find
that the category of professional matters seems to be given less weight
for the future compared to existing levels of cooperation. Similarly and
more significantly, two of the absolute core issues for trade unions, wages
and working hours, were perceived as more important for future coop-
eration in comparison with existing cooperation on these topics. This
may be a reaction to the consequences of the financial crisis when many
labour organizations in Europe had to accept wage and working time
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reductions. It may also signal that respondents believed that such ques-
tions—which are still nationally bound—would need to be discussed
more across Europe (Dribbusch et al. 2017; Müller and Platzer 2017).
One critical part of the European-level cooperation on wages has to do
with the minimum wage issue, to which we will come back in Chapter 3.
We ran regressions to examine the effects of industrial relations
regimes/regions, sectors and the size of organizations on all these items
(Vulkan and Larsson 2019). Previous outcomes were substantiated, indi-
cating that size played a clear role for the level of transnational coop-
eration and that unions in the services sector normally cooperated less
than unions in the other sectors. When it comes to the selection of spe-
cific topics to work on, sectoral differences turned out to have a greater
part than industrial relation regimes/regions. This is not very unexpected,
because the challenges that trade unions and their members meet vary
with sectoral and industry-specific conditions. Labour organizations in
construction showed an especially strong tendency to focus on occupa-
tional health and safety and migration issues. Unions organizing public
sector employees, particularly in healthcare, cooperated more than others
on the topic of public services cuts/austerity measures. Likewise, unions
in the metal sector directed more attention than others to cooperation
around unemployment/employment.
Obstacles to Cooperation
Given the views regarding the importance and benefits of transnational
cooperation and the extent of existing collaboration through networks
and meta-organizations, one might wonder whether unions believe that
everything is good enough already. The answer must in spite of this
be ‘no’, insofar as many of them stated that more cross-border activi-
ties would be desirable. Therefore we want to take a closer look at what
factors that hinder and facilitate cooperation.
To begin with obstacles, we asked unions to rate to what degree differ-
ent factors hindered union cooperation in Europe. The response patterns
appear in Table 2.9. The items are ranked by the total means and the first
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column of figures shows that differences in financial resources were gen-
erally regarded as the greatest obstacle of the ten factors listed, while dif-
ferences in national cultures and traditions were considered least impor-
tant. Yet, even the last in ranking gets a total mean of 2.51 on a scale
ranging from 1 to 4. In other words, cultural factors were not regarded as
unimportant, only less so than other factors. A general conclusion from
Table 2.9 could be that cross-border trade union cooperation has many
difficulties to defeat to develop positively.
From the compared means analysis in the following columns—and
originally tested in regressions (Larsson 2017)—we find marked varia-
tions in how some of these obstacles were weighed by trade unions in
different industrial relations regimes/regions. Central/Eastern European
organizations underscored difficulties with financial resources, compe-
tition between high- and low-wage countries, and employer organiza-
tions’ power strategies. Also Southern European unions seemed to deem
the latter to be a problem, but this result was not statistically significant
in the regressions. Nordic unions attributed employers’ power strategies
to be clearly less important. We also discovered some significant differ-
ences in the means on the three items related to culture. Compared to
other organizations, particularly those from the Central/Eastern Europe,
Western European unions regarded language issues to be less of an obsta-
cle. Difficulties based on ideological, political or religious diversity were
highlighted by Southern European respondents, while being viewed as
slightly less problematic by Central/Eastern European unions. Finally,
the Nordic unions rated differences in national cultures and traditions
somewhat higher as a barrier than did unions from the other regions.
Once again, the largest sectoral difference was that between, on the one
hand, labour organizations in manufacturing and construction empha-
sizing resources and, on the other hand, those representing services and
professional groups stressing members’ low prioritization and interest as
an obstacle to cross-border cooperation (Larsson 2012).
The interviews largely confirmed that differences in financial
resources—and especially the lack of resources among small unions and
unions in Central/Eastern Europe—were a great problem for cooper-
ation. It is also a dilemma for those with more resources, when their
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poorer partners cannot take part. The difficulty of prioritizing working
at European level—in light of the lacking interest among members—was
touched upon in the interviews too. It connects to the balance between
the logic of influence and the logic of membership. Differences in labour
market policy and regulations have varying implications in different sec-
tors. Whereas in healthcare it was frequently a matter of diverse financing
systems and educational requirements across Europe, in manufacturing
the discussion was about competition related to wage differentials and
more or less explicit strategies of governments to support certain indus-
tries. At a more general level, divergences in the regulations of working
conditions and the wage-setting processes make it difficult to reach an
understanding of what to aim for with cooperation in the ETUC and
the ETUFs—an issue to which we come back in the analysis of the min-
imum wage issue in Chapter 3. Cultural factors were talked about quite
extensively in the interviews, which is why we return to them immedi-
ately after paying attention to some of the facilitators for trade union
cooperation.
Factors Facilitating Cooperation
If the above are some of the most important obstacles to transnational
union cooperation, are there corresponding facilitators and, if so, which
are they? It may seem likely that these comprise ways to overcome the
existing barriers related to resources, institutional differences, low priori-
ties, resistance to European-level social dialogue from employers, etc. For
the purpose of validating the question on obstacles, we inquired about
the importance of a number of factors for union cooperation in Europe
to become successful (Table 2.10).
The results presented in Table 2.10 back up some of the outcomes
regarding the obstacles to cooperation. From the means we can draw
the conclusion that cultural factors had less weight than similarities in
labour market policies and regulation, similarities in occupational inter-
ests and well-developed personal networks and relations between trade
union leaders. The three culture-related items were, more or less, ranked
in the same way as they were as obstacles: language was considered more


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 Patterns of Transnational Trade Union Cooperation in Europe 63
important than similarities in ideological, political or religious orienta-
tions and similarities in national cultures and traditions came last among
the six factors listed.
Just as on the impediments to cooperation, we find some sig-
nificant differences in means when comparing industrial relations
regimes/regions (Larsson 2017). Central/Eastern and Western Euro-
pean unions scored higher on the importance of similarities of occu-
pational interests between unions. Further, Western European respon-
dents put markedly less weight on the role of personal networks than did
respondents from the other regimes. If these two results are somewhat
puzzling, the outcomes on cultural factors are noticeably more in
line with the previous analysis of how obstacles were perceived. Cen-
tral/Eastern European unions, which had the highest score on language
as a barrier to cooperation, also emphasized the significance of language
skills for successful cooperation. The Nordic labour organizations high-
lighted the value of similar ideological, political and religious orienta-
tions—as did those from Western Europe. Finally, the Southern Euro-
pean trade unions were relatively less inclined to stress similarities in
national culture and traditions for successful transnational union coop-
eration.
Cultural Obstacles to Cooperation
We now turn to the interview study to specify the cultural obstacles to
transnational trade union cooperation in Europe—what problems exist,
how and why cultural differences create problems and what cultural bor-
ders the respondents identified within Europe. The analysis is linked to
the previous quantitative investigation in that the three surveyed cultural
factors will be treated in the order of importance, as uncovered by results
above. First, we look at how and why language differences create prob-
lems. Then the focus is on obstacles related to unions’ ideological, politi-
cal or religious orientations. Finally, we bring up what the interviews tell
us about the role of differences and borders between national cultures.
The interviews verified that differences in mother tongue and lack of
foreign language skills were considered great obstacles (Larsson 2017,
2020). Especially Central/Eastern European respondents saw language
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barriers as ‘strong’, ‘essential’, ‘huge’ or even as ‘the major obstacle’ (cf.
Henning 2015a). Some interviewees from the English- and German-
speaking countries found these barriers to be less of a problem, since
good translations and interpretations exist. Others, however, acknowl-
edged the language difficulties, as for instance in this quotation from a
British unionist:
We’re very lucky because [we’re] English… In fact, some of our ETUF
meetings are only conducted in English, so that can be a barrier for other
organizations… Some people come and they never say anything. And
then other organizations, they can only send someone who is quite good
at speaking English.
The ETUC and ETUF congresses normally admit funding for up to
six language interpretations. At committee meetings, there are fewer
interpretations, while seminars and working groups are typically held
in English only, forcing participants to speak ‘some kind of joint bad
English’. This is problematic since some participants do not have the
skills and others are unwilling even to try to speak the meeting language.
Those lacking English skills thus have to forgo or bring their own inter-
preters (cf. Henning 2015a). Interpretation is not uncomplicated either,
because the precision or even the very substance may get lost in transla-
tion. Terms and concepts are embedded in, and always refer to, a cog-
nitive (and often normative) content and a common world of reference
(Barbier 2013: 109; cf. Hyman 2004). As a consequence, there are diffi-
culties of the kind mentioned as expressed by an Italian union represen-
tative (Larsson 2020: 7):
The Nordic countries [have] a different understanding of what ‘austerity’
means; what ‘crisis’ in the public sector means… You need to build a
common vocabulary … to understand what the others are saying. And if
the words are different—like ‘privatisation’ or ‘public sector’ or what the
meaning is of ‘autonomous’, ‘independent’… This is the major obstacle.
Translations of central documents may create problems too, because
there can be misunderstandings due to differences in connotations of
concepts. These linguistic problems are not only costly and hamper
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understanding, but they also reduce the possibility for some unions
to influence the discussion. These organizations are forced to choose
between having representatives staying silent or sending representatives
on the basis of their language skills rather than their expertise. An illus-
tration of this is taken from a Latvian interviewee (Larsson 2020: 7):
If we have two or three people who are capable of speaking in English,
the same people have to be competent in various themes and specific
subjects, and it is very hard to do that at a good level… It is very hard to
come out with an argument or a competent opinion of things.
The absence of a common language tends to make overall trust building
harder as well since small talk becomes more difficult. Some union rep-
resentatives asserted that it is in small talk that joint ideas are developed
and that ‘the real business gets done in the meeting beforehand or over
lunch’.
Trade unions also differ in their ideological, political and religious ori-
entations and it is well known that such differences can create problems
for collaboration. As discussed in Chapter 1, some are more of ‘business
unions’ mainly representing their members’ interests as cartels, while oth-
ers are more political or ‘movement unions’ trying to represent the inter-
ests of the working class or workers in general (Gumbrell-McCormick
and Hyman 2013: 6–28; Henning 2015b; Hyman 2001). Moreover,
there are organizations adhering to radical leftist political ideas, reformist
and consensus-oriented unions and those that are more on the conser-
vative side. The deepest rift in ideology appearing in the interviews was
said to go between consensus- and conflict-oriented traditions. These are
not neatly grouped regionally, but a main North–South divergence was
mentioned recurrently (cf. Henning 2015a; Larsson 2014). We can give
an example of how it was communicated by a Spanish representative
(Larsson 2020: 11):
There is a clear division North-South. We mobilize the workers at the
social and political level; we have general strikes, mass demonstrations
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in the streets. The Nordic unions have collective bargaining at the sec-
toral level or national level… It is, therefore, not easy to establish one
[common] way of trade union action at the European level.
Both other Southern European and Nordic union officials confirmed this
divide between cooperating and compromising with employers versus
having more conflictual and confrontational relations (cf. Lovén Seldén
2014). To some extent, the latter attitude may create misunderstandings
and even disapproval. Some Nordic interviewees talked about unions
in Southern Europe as being more of ‘campaign organizations’, which
do not take their seat at the negotiating table, but instead ‘go in the
streets and shout’. Whereas they saw themselves as ‘more constructive’,
they thought others would find them a bit ‘wimpish’, ‘not passionate
enough’, or ‘woody’. This was further supported when some Southern
European representatives characterized the Nordics as ‘less European’ or
as not being solidary.
Besides the North–South division, respondents also made comments
on an East–West difference (cf. Henning 2015b). Some Central/Eastern
European unions were said to have very different views, shaped by their
post-communist legacy of having strong connections to political par-
ties. Still, several interviewees acknowledged that North–South and East–
West typologies were too schematic, because there are different traditions
even within regions and countries—some being more homogenous and
others more fragmented. The internal fragmentation of the trade union
movement in some countries can, though, be taken as another aspect of
cultural difficulties, implying that unions from more homogenous con-
texts find it difficult to cooperate with those that are not even on speak-
ing terms within their own country (cf. Henning 2015a, b).
The factor that was attributed least importance in the survey was dif-
ferences in national cultures and traditions. It is perhaps a more abstract
dimension than the one on ideological, political and religious variations.
There are certainly overlaps between the two dimensions, but the one
of national cultures and traditions is presumably more general in char-
acter. When we—in our interviews—discussed the North–South split in
Europe, we once again ran into some schematic divisions, exemplified by
an Italian union representative (Larsson 2020: 8):
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It is easier for us [Italians] to have cooperation with the Mediterranean
countries—I am talking about Spanish and French …because we have
more or less the same culture, and it is easier for us to have good rela-
tions… When we talk with our colleagues from Scandinavia, it is com-
plicated [for them] to understand our problems, because, you know, they
are very far from us.
In a similar vein, a British respondent viewed relations with French col-
leagues as difficult, using the following words: ‘/T/hat is partly about
language, but it is also about the traditions and the way they do things’.
This cultural divide is linked to the ideological gap discussed above, but
it was seen as going beyond ideology (Larsson 2020: 10):
The Nordic countries are used to negotiating, the Germans are, and we
[British] are… It is culture! And it is easier for us to do business with
the Nordics and the Germans, because they understand, or we have a
common interest in doing a deal. Whereas it seems to me—and I am
aware that I am stereotyping culturally—the French and the Spanish and
the Greeks in particular come to those meetings to make a point, to make
a speech.
These differences appear not only in basic values and conceptions, but
also in traditional everyday practices like what is expected in social sit-
uations and how one expresses oneself. They include everything from
how delegates from various countries stick to the starting times of meet-
ings to how much they talk and how they interact socially. Such things
may seem trivial, but they affect the internal processes in the European
organizations. One example is the difference between the more ‘talkative’
Southern European delegates and the more ‘taciturn’ Nordic, as shown
in a study of speech patterns at ETUC Executive Committee meetings
(Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2016). At such meetings, the Nordic dele-
gates are coordinated through their joint organizations (Seeliger 2019:
169–170, 212–213, 226). Their position is already negotiated and they
have little need to mark a unique position, as explained by a Swedish
unionist: ‘So we give a few statements to explain our position, and then
the others get to talk’. This was said to lead to confusion and even irri-
tation from others, who, in contrast ‘must express their organization and
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its ideas, values and agenda’, irrespective of others voicing a similar line
of argument.
Cultural features are important for how the member organizations of
the ETUC and the ETUFs perceive both the content and legitimacy
of decisions. A representative of a joint Nordic organization suggested
that the decision-making in these organizations ‘does not have the same
strong formalistic approach to democracy that we have here’. There is sel-
dom any voting except in congresses and the process is rather consensus-
seeking, followed by an attempt to spell out the decisions in an under-
standable summary—as argued by a Swedish unionist (Larsson 2020:
10):
We have our model in Sweden—how to do it. The Germanic model:
then you have the question ‘Who is for; who is against; someone who
abstains?’ We don’t do it like that here. This must be learned. If you don’t,
you immediately will kick up a row. And why? Because then they will
not understand what they have decided… So, clearly, cultural differences
make it difficult. And that is why it is necessary to understand these
cultural differences… I have seen those who have failed with that. The
consequence was crazy decisions—if any decisions at all.
Cultural differences can hence have quite serious consequences. They
affect not only whether decisions are perceived as legitimate, but also
how their content is understood—and may as a result also influence how
well they are implemented.
Some cultural borders between East and West were mentioned and
they were from time to time associated with the question of ideology.
It was said that some Central/Eastern European societies were ‘hierocra-
cies’ and ‘post-communist’ rather than ‘democratic’ (cf. Henning 2015b).
This was recognized by both Western and Central/Eastern European
respondents. There could, however, also be resistance to such catego-
rization: A trade union official from Latvia emphasized that the Baltic
States are not part of a Central/Eastern European culture, but have more
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in common with the Nordic countries. A Hungarian representative dis-
missed the idea of a great cultural divide, arguing that the cultural diver-
gences in Europe were nothing compared to those between Europe and
other continents:
Today in Europe, this is no problem; more and more people work in
England, Germany, Sweden. More Hungarian people work in Sweden. I
think there is no distance in culture. No problem. Other nations: Asian
nations, Muslim, or African nations have other cultures, but Hungary,
no problem. Hungary is very, very similar to Germany. We have a lot of
German companies.
This kind of relativity of cultural borders also appeared when the inter-
views centred on regions that are presented as culturally homogeneous.
For many, the Nordic countries make up such a region, because they ‘live
in the same cultural world’ and ‘see things the same way’. Nevertheless,
when viewed more closely, these similarities were sometimes dissolved. In
practice, there could be cultural heterogeneity in the joint Nordic orga-
nizations (Larsson 2020: 9):
The Danish… are very straightforward… If you are quiet, you have noth-
ing to say, from a Danish perspective. While in Finland, it may well be
that you are talking in a different way, you have a bit longer pauses and
so, but if you sit in a meeting you are expected to be asked by the chair-
man of the meeting about what to do. And if you are not asked, you
leave the meeting feeling trampled on.
It is important not to exaggerate these cultural variations and the difficul-
ties they create for trade union cooperation. As we could see in Table 2.9,
cultural differences were not perceived as the most important obstacles
to cooperation. It is possible for actors to overcome many of the cultural
barriers. An Italian representative stated this plainly: ‘It is not easy at the
very beginning. But if you participate in many meetings, during many
years, you can do it’. What is more, we should not neglect the existence
of solidarity across countries and the shared values in the European polit-
ical culture and trade union movement (Gajewska 2009; Pernicka and
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Glassner 2014). If there were nothing of this kind, union cooperation
would not be possible at all.
Note
1. At cross-sectoral level, there is the Council of Nordic Trade Unions; at
sectoral level in the five sectors studied, there are the Industrial Employees
in the Nordic region, the Nordic Building and Woodworkers’ Federation,
the Nordic Transport Workers’ Federation, Nordic Financial Unions and
the Nordic Public Employees Trade Unions.
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The European Trade UnionMovement
and the Issue of StatutoryMinimumWages
Abstract Most countries in Europe have minimum wage legislation, but
there are some exceptions such as the Nordic countries. The issue has
clearly divided European trade unions and Nordic unions represent a
foothold for the resistance to this kind of regulation. To provide a more
detailed picture of European labour organizations’ arguments for and
against minimum wage legislation, data from interviews and surveys as
well as documents are used. There is obviously a deep cleavage within
the European trade union movement and the chapter also describes how
the ETUC has handled the diverging positions.
Keywords Statutory minimum wages · Trade union disagreement ·
ETUC compromise
Introduction
We now turn to a topic that has caused a great deal of debate within the
European trade union movement: the issue of statutory minimum wages.
Most Nordic trade unions as well as some others take a negative view on
minimum wage legislation—in sharp contrast to many other organiza-
tions in different parts of Europe (e.g., Eldring and Alsos 2012: 84–87;
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2015; Furåker 2017; Furåker and Bengtsson 2013: 172–173; Furåker
and Lovén Seldén 2013; Schulten 2008: 434; 2014; Schulten et al.
2015: 345–350; Seeliger 2019: 54–61, 155–172; Vande Keybus 2012).
Because of these differences of opinion, the issue has been repeatedly
debated within the ETUC that has faced difficulties in finding a com-
mon policy on the matter. It seems, however, that the issue was settled—
at least temporarily—some years ago. The present chapter describes parts
of the discussion.
Our purpose is to examine somewhat more closely the arguments for
and against statutory minimum wages and how the ETUC has handled
the issue. We make use of various kinds of data derived from interviews,
surveys and documents. Data were collected in our two research projects
described in Chapter 1 of this book. To begin with, we briefly outline
some of the characteristics of minimum wage legislation in Europe. Then
there is a section on the principal pros and cons of statutory minimum
wages, commonly brought forward by trade unions. For the purpose of
describing these opinions, interviews with trade union officials are par-
ticularly important. After that we report a series of relevant results from
our two surveys. Several questions referred to the organizations’ attitudes
to statutory minimum wages, among other things whether they could
see advantages and disadvantages with legislation. Next we turn to the
cleavage in the European trade union movement and how the ETUC
has managed to reach a compromise. The chapter ends with a conclud-
ing discussion.
Statutory MinimumWages in Europe: A Brief
Background
Most EU Member States have legislated minimum wage levels; there
are only six exceptions: Austria, Denmark, Cyprus, Finland, Italy and
Sweden (Eurofound 2019b). Both Cyprus and Italy appear to be on
the road to introduce statutory minima. In Cyprus there is occupation-
specific statutory minimum wages for some and collectively agreed min-
imum wages for others. Austria has had a debate on the issue, but so
far kept its system relying on collective agreements. Iceland, Norway and
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Switzerland, which are not members in the EU, have no legislation. It
should be added that both Iceland and Norway, as well as Finland, admit
extension of collective agreements by law, although in the Norwegian
case this option has been less often made use of (Eldring and Alsos 2015:
71–78). Denmark and Sweden do not have statutory minimum wages
or any erga omnes rules. Germany is currently the most recent country
to have adopted legislation. This occurred in 2015 through a political
decision in spite of some criticism from the social partners (Eurofound
2019b: 2).
There are significant differences among the countries with legislation
as to the levels of statutory minimum wages (Eurofound 2019a). Lux-
embourg has the highest level—nominally more than seven times higher
than Bulgaria, which has the lowest. The rough general pattern is that
the highest figures appear in North Western European countries and the
lowest in the East with the South in between. Most countries have had
increases in real terms since 2010, in particular Romania, Bulgaria and
Lithuania. In some cases, especially France, Malta and the Netherlands,
the increases are small and for Greece and Belgium we actually discover
a decrease.
With huge differences in living standards across Europe we could
expect to see more or less corresponding cross-national differences in the
levels of statutory minimum wages. Therefore the so-called Kaitz index
is perhaps a more interesting piece of information. This indicator mea-
sures the ratio between the legal minimum wage and the average (mean
or median) wage in a country. From the OECD database, we can con-
vey information on the Kaitz index 2017 among EU Member States. In
relation to median wages of full-time workers, it was highest for France
and Romania (both with 0.62), followed by Portugal (0.61) and the low-
est figures turned out for Spain (0.40), the Czech Republic and Estonia
(both with 0.41). Measured as a proportion of mean wages for full-time
workers, France is still at the top (0.50), ahead of three countries with
0.44: Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. At the bottom, we find
Greece (0.33), Spain (0.34) and the Czech Republic and Estonia (both
with 0.35).
Another indicator is the proportion of workers being paid at the level
of statutory minimum wages or even lower (Eurofound 2019a: 23–24).
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It varies substantially across Europe. Poland has the highest proportion
(13.7%), followed by the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Germany and
Portugal with figures above 10%. The lowest proportions appear for the
Czech Republic (2%), with Malta, Belgium and Croatia just a little bit
higher.
In 12 of the EU Member States, there are special rates for certain
categories (Eurofound 2019a: 26). Mostly these special rates apply to
younger or less-skilled workers. The goal is to make these workers more
attractive in the labour market by letting employers hire them to lower
costs than would be the case with the ordinary statutory minimum
wages. In some countries, for example Hungary, there are higher rates
for skilled employees.
Some recent research in Europe covers the relationship between statu-
tory minimum wages and such aspects as working hours and employ-
ment (Eurofound 2019a: 34). We have access to new studies on these
topics in Germany, Greece and Ireland (Bonin et al. 2019; Bruttel 2019;
Caliendo et al. 2018; Georgiadis et al. 2018; McGuiness and Redmond
2018). The general result is that the impact on employment has been
small. Legislation has led to an increase in hourly wages, but it has also
tended to reduce working hours. When Ireland increased the minimum
wage level with 6% in 2016, it led to a substantial decline of work-
ing hours, especially for those with temporary employment contracts
(McGuiness and Redmond 2018).
An interesting case is Germany that implemented minimum wages
legislation in 2015. With a high level of minimum pay, the new reg-
ulation apparently has favoured ‘low educated, marginally employed,
women and people with migration background’ (Caliendo et al. 2018:
30). At the same time, overall employment appeared to have undergone a
slight decrease, due to diminished recruitment and a decrease of marginal
employment, that is, so-called mini-jobs. No clear effects were found on
people’s livelihood, because there was also a clear reduction in working
hours. Poverty and inequality were therefore not much affected. Finally,
available evidence pointed to a significant non-compliance with the rules;
large numbers of employees were paid less than required by law.
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Another German study found rather similar results (Bonin et al.
2019). After two years there had been a reduction of marginal employ-
ment, but the researchers could not confirm any significant changes in
regular employment and unemployment. One factor that should not be
neglected is that people who previously had mini-jobs to some extent had
become self-employed and therefore stood outside the minimum wage
legislation.
A third study also found that the increase of hourly wages did not
imply higher monthly pay, as there was a parallel reduction of working
hours (Bruttel 2019). Companies that paid less than the minimum wage
level before 2015 increased their prices, but nonetheless got lower profits.
However, the effects of the legislation on the overall economy appeared
to have been limited. Furthermore, the problem of non-compliance was
again emphasized; it remained a crucial task to ensure better compliance.
Yet another conclusion was that people’s welfare dependency and risk for
poverty did not diminish.
An interesting question is whether the bottom level is set sufficiently
high to avoid poverty. The statutory minimum wages in many European
countries are so low that they do not prevent income poverty (Schulten
2014: 13). It should be noted that the percentage of working poor is
generally lower in the Nordic countries as well as in Italy than elsewhere
in Europe (Eldring and Alsos 2015: 34–36; Schulten 2014). As a conse-
quence, it may not be so easy to convince trade unions in these countries
that legislation is necessary to avoid in-work poverty.
Arguments for Legislated MinimumWages
Trade unions can have different motives for taking a certain position in
the debate on statutory minimum wages. It is unclear to what extent
empirical studies in the field have an impact on the debate. Unions’
motives may be more or less ideological or pragmatic and they can show
more or less solidarity with various actors. In this and the next section we
identify some of the most important arguments among trade unionists
for and against minimum wage legislation. Indicators of these claims are
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also included in one of the empirical datasets (survey 2) that we use. We
start with arguments about possible advantages.
Legislated minimum wages might secure that all workers—and not
only the organized—are covered (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013;
Schulten 2008; Schulten and Watt 2007). In one of our studies, a
Spanish trade union official, interviewed in 2012, presented the argu-
ment in the following way (Furåker 2017):
The strongest argument for minimum wages is that it is necessary to
protect all workers by one instrument… But it is not necessary to have it
by law; it could just as well be by collective bargaining. This is a difference
of culture, because in some other countries it is a tradition to protect only
affiliates—perhaps 10, 20, 30%—and not workers who are not members.
We come from a tradition in which the unions fight for all. In Spain we
have 19-20% union density and 80% are non-members.
The assumption was then that employers comply with the minimum
wage legislation. It is worth being repeated that studies of the German
introduction of such legislation emphasized that there could be some
substantial non-compliance (Bruttel 2019: 11–12; Caliendo et al. 2018:
30). Yet we can expect that even if not all unorganized employees are
protected by law, some of them are likely to be. It can still be a fairly
effective method of creating protection for the unorganized.
One thing to note is that the Spanish union official did not declare
that legislation would be the only option; his opinion was that minimum
wages could just as well be decided through collective bargaining. The
point is, though, that if merely very few of the workers are unionized, a
majority may not be protected by collective bargaining—unless there is
extension of collective agreements by law.
Two German trade union representatives who were interviewed
together said that they would prefer wages be set through collective
bargaining, but if this was not feasible, other solutions must come in
(Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 514). What they actually referred to
was minimum wage legislation. This should be seen in light of the declin-
ing union density rate in Germany like in many other countries, imply-
ing that more and more employees stayed unorganized.
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Another Spanish union official, who was interviewed in 2012, also
stressed how important it would be with minimum wage legislation to
protect workers, but he brought up yet another principal argument by
pointing out that minimum wage legislation establishes a clear limit to
wage dumping (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 514): ‘The second rea-
son may be that if you have a minimum wage you have a limit to wage
dumping’.
This argument was also mentioned in several other interviews that
we conducted in our two research projects (cf. Vande Keybus 2012).
Again, a crucial problem is whether employers comply with the legisla-
tion, because non-compliance can be interpreted as just another expres-
sion for wage dumping. It is at least likely that statutory minima establish
some limits to dumping of that kind. Therefore, they might be seen as
measures to decrease inequalities in society (Schulten 2008; Schulten and
Watt 2007; Vande Keybus 2012).
A mechanism that helps prevent wage dumping may also contribute
to decreasing poverty. The German studies referred to above (Bruttel
2019; Caliendo et al. 2018) did not find this kind of effect, but the
poverty-reducing impact of statutory minimum wages has still often been
brought forward as a positive argument in the debate. Sometimes it has
been proposed that minimum wage legislation should help people get a
‘living wage’ (Schulten 2008; Schulten et al. 2015: 339–341).
We should keep a distinction between minimum wage legislation at
national level and such regulation at European level. National legisla-
tion already exists in many countries, but could be extended to coun-
tries without legislation. It is also possible to make rules stricter and
more difficult not to follow. In addition, there is the question about
the minimum wage levels in relation to the general wage situation in
a country. At European level, no regulation of minimum wages exists,
but it might be implemented in different ways. There are many advo-
cates for introducing a common European policy in this regard (Eldring
and Alsos 2015: 13–21; Fernández-Marcías and Vacas-Soriano 2016;
Schulten 2008, 2014; Schulten and Müller 2014; Vande Keybus 2012;
Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). This is a more far-reaching idea, which
might be especially difficult to accept for unions with a negative atti-
tude even to national legislation. It is of course unrealistic with a single
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minimum wage level throughout the EU. What is closest at hand would
be to implement an EU directive according to which statutory mini-
mum wages should be set at, for example, 60% of the average wage in
each Member State (cf. Schulten 2014). In the following, both of these
dimensions will be touched upon. First, we proceed to describe possible
arguments against minimum wage legislation, with primarily a national-
level focus.
Arguments against Legislated Minimum
Wages
From previous research and various documents, we can outline the
main arguments behind trade unions’ negative views on statutory min-
imum wages. On the whole, the countries without statutory minimum
wages appear to have a viable option. The Nordic countries have high
union density rates and a high degree of collective bargaining coverage,
although there is some variation between them. This is true even though
union density tends to fall everywhere in the Nordic region except Ice-
land. Other countries without minimum wage legislation have lower
density rates and lower levels of collective bargaining coverage, but com-
pared to many other countries they still score relatively high in these
respects.
Legislation on minimum wages is regarded as a restriction on the part-
ners’ freedom to conclude independent agreements (Eldring and Alsos
2015: 85). When we interviewed highly placed officials in the Swedish
trade union confederations some years ago, the principle of independent
collective bargaining was energetically stressed as being very important.
Such an opinion was communicated very distinctly in an interview with
a Swedish trade union official (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 514).
The main argument against [a minimum wage policy] is that it contra-
dicts our strategy of organizing, negotiating and signing collective agree-
ments and monitoring whether the collective agreements are respected,
and by doing so taking control over the destiny of workers… To act as a
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supply cartel is simply… a fundamental traditional trade union view. To
support a statutory minimum wage is a strong violation of that tradition.
Moreover, it seems that the Nordic trade unions are also afraid that an
acceptance of minimum wage legislation would be followed by further
European regulations (Eldring and Alsos 2015: 84). They simply want
to safeguard the Nordic model with its emphasis on the autonomy and
integrity of collective bargaining.
We may ask whether or not collective bargaining leads to better results
for workers. Minimum wage legislation should at least maintain a lowest
limit, unless employers fail to comply with the law. A relevant piece of
information in this context is brought up by Line Eldring and Kristin
Alsos (2015: 74–78, 85); they make the observation that, in selected
key industries in the Nordic countries, wages significantly exceeded the
agreed minima. This outcome applied also in industries with low collec-
tive bargaining coverage. The explanation is held to be a contagion effect
of collective agreements. Legislated minimum wages can then be a blow
in the air and this is not all: their consequences may even go in the oppo-
site direction. Actually, it is a possible disadvantage recognized by some
of those arguing for legislation as well. One of our interviewees, from a
Belgian trade union, pointed out that because legislation would set the
lowest pay level, it could be difficult to obtain a higher wage than that
(Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 515). The same opinion was expressed
in another interview with a Spanish union official (Furåker and Lovén
Seldén 2013: 515):
Once you have a minimum wage, sometimes it can be very difficult to
improve a lot on that minimum wage. So you have your minimum wage
and that is okay, but [it] can be difficult to have improvements on that
because that is the economic reality… and I suppose that would be the
main reason against it.
It should be noted that the Belgian and the Spanish unionists just men-
tioned were both strongly in favour of legislation. A further possible
disadvantage with state regulation of minimum wages is that it could
weaken employees’ motivation to become unionized (Eldring and Alsos
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2015: 85–86; Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 515). It is always a crit-
ical issue for trade unions to recruit members, and this will certainly
not be made simpler if wages are set without unions having very much
to say. This reasoning could be relevant in relation to employer orga-
nizations too. However, unions (and employers’ associations) may have
a role in contributing to deciding the legislated minimum wages. Thus,
unions could get a more visible role at societal level, even if this would be
restricted to peak-level organizations (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013:
515; Vande Keybus 2012).
In the last two sections, we have brought up a number of possible
advantages and disadvantages of statutory minimum wages. The ambi-
tion has not been to provide an exhaustive description, but we have tried
to focus on rather tangible aspects. There are other aspects that could also
be mentioned, for example, that a joint position among trade unions on
European minimum wage legislation could have an important symbolic
value, ‘giving substance to Social Europe’ (Vaughan-Whitehead 2010:
529).
What Do Survey Data Tell Us?
In our two surveys, we have some questions concerning statutory min-
imum wages. As to the 2010–2011 survey we limit the presentation to
countries in which the number of responding unions exceeded 10, which
means results for 11 countries. The questionnaire included a number
of items intended to gauge attitudes to minimum wages. Respondents
were asked to what extent they agreed with certain statements—to a high
degree, to some degree, to a low degree1 or not at all.
The first statement says that it would require EU legislation on min-
imum wages to prevent wage dumping. The second item taps the desir-
ability of future developments of national legislation on minimum wages,
either through the introduction of such legislation (if it does not exist)
or through stricter legislation (if it already exists). Union representatives
were accordingly expected to interpret the statement in accordance with
their own location. The third item in the questionnaire deals with the
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issue whether, at transnational level, it would be desirable in the future
with European legislation on minimum wages.
Table 3.1 presents the summary indicators for the 11 countries on
each of the items. Summary indicators are calculated in the same way
as in two of the tables in Chapter 2 (Tables 2.1 and 2.3). Starting with
the first statement, we should note that at this time not only the four
Nordic countries were without minimum wage legislation; this was also
the case for Germany. It is striking that all the responding unions in
Belgium, Poland and Spain agreed at least to some degree that it would
take EU legislation on minimum pay to prevent wage dumping. The
summary indicators for France and Germany are slightly lower because
some unions deviate from the common pattern. Still, in both cases a
clear majority of unions expressed a great deal of agreement with the
statement. The United Kingdom comes next in the ranking with a lower
level of agreement, but still with a markedly positive score after the sum-
mary indicator calculation. Finland also gets a positive end result, but it
is not very far from zero. For the remaining Nordic countries, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, the summary indicators are negative. Denmark is
not so distant from Finland, while Sweden is undoubtedly farthest away.
The response pattern on the second item is fairly similar to the first
one, but there are some differences. Instead of Belgium, Poland and
Spain at the top, we find Germany, Poland and Spain. We can add that
90% of the 20 Polish respondents agreed ‘to a high degree’ (not shown),
implying that they would like to have stricter legislation. For Spain, the
result goes in the same direction, but with a much lower proportion
answering ‘to a high degree’. As to Germany, the outcome suggests that
national legislation on minimum wages was, more or less, on the unions’
wish list. In Belgium, three out of eleven trade unions did not select the
two most positive response options and this was the case for five out of
eighteen French organizations as well. Hence, the summary indicators in
the two countries are quite similar. An interpretation of this is that many
respondents were fairly satisfied with the national minimum wage legisla-
tion; they did not find it desirable to make it stricter. The British unions
emerge as more divided. For the Nordic cluster, we see strongly nega-
tive figures in the summary indicator column. Notably, the proportions
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answering that they did not agree at all are particularly high in Sweden
and Denmark.
The final item in Table 3.1 deals with the issue whether it would be
desirable in the future with European legislation on minimum wages.
The highest summary indicators—for Poland, Spain and Belgium—
are then slightly below 100, as a few trade unions in these coun-
tries expressed doubts about such an arrangement. German and French
respondents also appear with high positive figures. The British unions
have a negative summary indicator, although far from the Nordic unions,
which all show very little consensus on the idea of future European leg-
islation.
With respect to our 2015–2016 survey we have answers from 221
trade unions. The survey contained seven questions with relevance for
the minimum wage issue or—to be more specific—statements on which
respondents were asked to express their organizations’ view. The over-
riding question was: ‘To what degree does your organization agree with
the following statements on nationally legislated minimum wages?’ Six
of the items include statements that can be regarded as arguments for
or against national legislation. They gauge whether statutory minimum
wages (a) ‘are necessary to prevent wage dumping’; (b) ‘undermine the
role of trade unions’; (c) ‘are the best way for unorganized workers to
get decent wages’; (d) ‘are necessary to prevent poverty’; (e) ‘make it
more difficult for unions to recruit members’ and (f ) ‘may lead to lower
collectively agree wages’. The seventh statement was aimed at exploring
attitudes to a possible role for the ETUC and has the following wording:
‘ETUC should work for common European norms on minimum wages’.
Each of the seven items could be answered in the same way as reported
for the items in Table 3.1.
Three of the statements thus represent possible advantages with statu-
tory minimum wages and three others represent possible disadvantages.
In the following, we divide the trade unions into three categories. One
consists of those in countries with legislated minimum wages and then
we have two categories in countries without such legislation: non-Nordic
and Nordic. The reason why we treat the Nordic unions separately is that
they are frequently depicted as the most negative to political regulation of
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wage setting (e.g., Furåker 2017; Eldring and Alsos 2012, 2015; Schul-
ten et al. 2015; Seeliger 2019: 155–172). As a consequence, we have only
17 respondents from unions in other countries without legislation, but
without this distinction certain interesting differences would not become
visible. Table 3.2 gives the responses on the first set of statements, dealing
with conceivable advantages with legislation.
As we can see, unions in countries with minimum wage legislation
were much more inclined to endorse the statements that contain the
arguments in support of such arrangements. This comes out clearly,
when we concentrate on the summary indicators. They are strongly pos-
itive for unions in countries with statutory minimum wages, but there
are some differences between the items: a very high score for the state-
ment regarding wage dumping, distinctly lower on the item regarding
the consequences for unorganized workers and somewhere in between
for the avoid-poverty statement. There are of course unions, which have
expressed a deviant opinion, but they are not that many. For trade unions
in non-Nordic countries without statutory minimum wages, the corre-
sponding scores are all much lower, but two out of three are still positive.
The exception with a low negative number is the item on legislation as
the best way for unorganized workers to get decent wages. In contrast,
we find large negative figures for the Nordic trade unions, roughly vary-
ing between minus one-third and minus 40 on the summary indicators
in the three cases.
Table 3.3 presents the response patterns regarding arguments against
statutory minimum wages. In these cases, trade unions in the countries
with minimum wage legislation have strongly negative summary indi-
cators. With some variation, this holds for all three items in the table.
It seems that these respondents did not generally believe that legisla-
tion would undermine the role of unions nor make it more difficult for
them to recruit members or that it would lead to lower collectively agreed
wages. Again, there are organizations that have responded differently, but
very few answered that they agreed ‘to a high degree’ with these negative
statements.
For the unions in non-Nordic countries without legislation, a some-
what different pattern comes out. These organizations have two rather
low, but still positive summary indicators: on the first and on the third
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statement. For them, the second item is an exception with a highly neg-
ative balance, not so far from what we see for unions in countries with
statutory minimum wages. The Nordic unions also get a negative sum-
mary indicator on this statement, even if it is much closer to zero. In
other words, most of the responding organizations did not find that leg-
islation would make it more difficult for them to recruit members. With
respect to the first and the third item, the Nordic unions generally agreed
to a high or some degree with the presumed disadvantages. We could
note that the proportions of ‘do-not-know’ answers are especially high in
the Nordic cluster. Although partly with lower numbers, this also applies
to Table 3.2.
On the seventh item in the questionnaire—on whether the ETUC
should work for common minimum wage norms in Europe—most trade
unions in countries with legislation responded in the affirmative, as we
can see in Table 3.4. There is not much doubt on the topic among these
organizations; most of them at least appeared to be sure about one thing
to which the ETUC should devote its power.
The non-Nordic unions in countries without legislation also tended to
agree with the statement, although the summary indicator is somewhat
lower. In contrast, the Nordic respondents provided a very different set
of answers, adding up to a distinctly negative summary value, but 14%
replied that they did not know.
The Cleavage in the European Trade Union
Movement
Our examination of data points to a distinct conclusion. While many
unions in Europe are strongly in favour of minimum wage legislation,
others and especially Nordic unions are very negative to it (Eldring and
Alsos 2015; Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013; Furåker 2017; Schulten
et al. 2015; Seeliger 2019: 155–172). Typically, in the Nordic countries
this kind of arrangement is at best considered to be ‘a necessary evil’
(Eldring and Alsos 2015). In other words, there are rival views on the
topic in the European trade union movement. The Nordic trade unions
may seem to be united in their resistance to minimum wage legislation,
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but we should note some cracks in the facade. Also in this region we
find some differences of opinion and some disagreement. As the sum-
mary indicators presented above are never 100 or −100 for the Nordic
unions, some of them must have responded in another way than the
majority. Moreover, the proportions of ‘do-not-know’ answers turned out
to be highest in the Nordic cluster. Anyway, some Nordic unions were
evidently not very negative to legislation or could not take a stand.
A much talked about event took place in 2014 in Copenhagen, where
the ETUC Executive Committee held a meeting. Bente Sorgenfrey,
Chairperson of the Confederation of Professionals in Demark, Presi-
dent for the Council of Nordic Trade Unions and member of the ETUC
Executive Committee, then spoke in favour of statutory minimum wages
(Eurofound 2015). After bringing up her arguments at a press conference
there was an immediate and massive reaction from both other Danish
unions and Danish employers’ associations, which all emphatically said
no thanks to minimum wage legislation. This was not the only time that
Sorgenfrey was in focus. Nordic Labour Journal (2015: 3–7) had a the-
matic issue on statutory minimum wages and there she was quoted, high-
lighting that many European colleagues advocated European minimum
wage legislation and arguing that Nordic trade union leaders should sup-
port them. She was also reported to mention that the Norwegian model
with the possibility of extending collective agreements by law could be a
reasonable way forward.
Another example of differing Nordic opinions stems from the Swedish
Transport Workers’ Union. This organization raised the issue of making
collective agreements into law (Nordic Labour Journal 2015: 14–15) at
about the same time as Sorgenfrey came out with her views on the del-
icate question. In an interview, conducted within our second research
project in 2015, the chairman of the organized transport workers noted
that this initiative was ‘not popular in the LO2’, in spite of his argu-
ment ‘that we are in the industry that has been most exposed to social
dumping’—which, he said, would require some action.
Albeit these examples, a Nordic comparison showed that the Dan-
ish and Swedish trade unions were the most negative to minimum wage
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legislation (Furåker 2017). The analysis also revealed that larger organi-
zations were less prone to see advantages with legislation and large orga-
nizations are of course relatively influential in the cooperation within the
ETUC.
It should not be very surprising that unions in countries where statu-
tory minimum wages exist are more likely to see advantages with legisla-
tion than are unions in countries without such measures. Obviously, the
reverse also applies. The most important observation is, however, that
the diverging opinions create conflicts in connection with transnational
trade union cooperation. The continuing resistance to state regulation
among Nordic trade unions makes us quote three other researchers ask-
ing why ‘the apparently robust and sustainable Nordic labour market
regimes could feel threatened by a European minimum wage policy that
is intended primarily for countries with low minimum wage levels or no
functioning minimum wage regimes’ (Schulten et al. 2015: 350). The
answer is most likely a fear among the Nordic unions that their own
model would be negatively affected by legislation and that acceptance of
it might be the first step towards further European regulations (Eldring
and Alsos 2015: 84).
We may also ask whether the concept of solidarity is relevant. Rebecka
Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman (2015; Hyman 2002) have
shown that this concept can be interpreted in different ways. Among
other things, the point of departure for trade unions is that work-
ers’ interests need to be taken care of by a collective organization.
There is also a distinction between solidarity with and solidarity against
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2015: 2). A typical example can be
when workers feel solidarity with one another and against employers.
As to the European discussion on statutory minimum wages, it seems
that we find trade unions standing against each other. Whereas some
organizations want to campaign for stricter national legislation, more
generous minimum wage levels and perhaps a common European pol-
icy on the issue, others are simply against any such attempt. It is likely
that both camps are fighting for those they feel solidarity with. The
basis for the cleavage in the European trade union movement is the dif-
ferences in organizational, structural and institutional power that exist
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between unions in different parts of Europe (cf. Chapter 1; Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman 2013: 30–31; Lehndorff et al. 2017).
Not least within the ETUC, we see these conflicting views colouring
the debates over the years. Martin Seeliger (2019: 155–172) gives a vivid
portrayal of the intense disagreements among European trade unionists
on the issue of statutory minimum wages. Among other things, he inter-
viewed a number of Hungarian, Polish and Swedish trade union repre-
sentatives and these interview data are used as empirical evidence in his
analysis. The Poles and the Hungarians were positive to minimum wage
legislation and the Swedes were fervently against it. There were occasions
when the debate was very heated, apparently with more solidarity against
than solidarity with unions in other countries.
This also points at how important labour market policies and reg-
ulations are for transnational trade union cooperation. As shown in
Chapter 2, differences in these respects were judged to be the second
most important obstacle to such collaboration and similarities were con-
sidered the most important facilitator. It has simply been difficult to find
a common cooperative basis for unions with respect to the issue of min-
imum wage legislation.
The ETUC is what Göran Ahrne and Nils Brunsson (2008) call a
meta-organization, with other organizations as members (cf. also Lovén
Seldén 2014: 30–31). One characteristic of meta-organizations is their
tendency to search for consensus in decision-making (Ahrne and Brun-
sson 2008: 123–124). It is of great importance for building up legitimacy
in relation to their members. We can see that the ETUC has handled dis-
agreement regarding the issue of statutory minimum wages in line with
this observation.
The minimum wage issue was on the agenda at the ETUC Congress
in Seville in 2007. In a strategy and action plan, it was suggested, among
other things, that the organization and its affiliated unions should work
for the following (ETUC 2007: 138):
• Support union campaigns for effective minimum wages in those coun-
tries where the unions consider them necessary. Targets should be set
as part of a purposeful campaign towards “living” wages and to tackle
the growing gaps between rich and poor, men and women.
96 B. Furåker and B. Larsson
• Targets to close the pay gaps should also be adopted by those unions
whose confidence in the effectiveness of their collective bargaining
processes means that they do not need legally established minimum
wages.
• Explore continually the scope for united campaigns at European level,
led by the ETUC, for common standards on minimum pay and
income, and for collective bargaining strategies. Currently it may be
that, for example, the differences in skills, productivity, living stan-
dards and union policies are too great for a campaign on common
European-wide minimum wage mechanisms, but as circumstances
change the ETUC must be ready to lead a debate on united cam-
paigns.
We can notice that the ETUC balanced the disagreements within the
organization. The idea is to support campaigns for minimum wage leg-
islation only ‘where unions consider them necessary’. Still, it was con-
sidered important to attack pay gaps also in countries where unions
did not see a need for minimum wage legislation. In addition to this,
it was argued that cross-national differences may be too great for ‘a
campaign on common European-wide minimum wage mechanisms’,
although things might change.
After the preparatory phase of the ETUC Congress in Athens 2011,
there was a great deal of debate in the organization on minimum wages.
It was important for the ETUC to avoid open conflict and the orga-
nization therefore needed to find a balance between different interests.
In a previous article we compared various documents, showing certain
changes of wordings (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 517, Note 6):
In October 2011 the ETUC (2011a: 6) claimed that ‘a minimum wage
norm would be agreed determining the minimum pay level in each coun-
try’, but only somewhat later, in December 2011, the organization stated
‘that wherever it exists the effective national minimum wage should be
at least equal to 50 per cent of the average wage or 60 per cent of the
median wage’ (ETUC 2011b: 6). The key words are ‘in each country’
and ‘where it exists’ and the latter wording is a remission to those who
did not want legislation (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2013: 517, Note 6).
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A stringent formulation of the ETUC position on statutory minimum
wages, which also strikes the balance between the diverging interests
came some years later (ETUC 2012a; cf. also 2013):
Wage setting [is] to remain a national matter and be dealt with accord-
ing to national practices and industrial relations systems. Negotiations
between social partners at the relevant level are the best tool to secure
good wages and working conditions. The statutory minimum wage
in those countries where trade unions consider it necessary should be
increased substantially. In any event all wage floors should respect Coun-
cil of Europe standards on fair wages.
The main idea in the above quotation is that national industrial rela-
tions systems and practices should have a crucial role in wage setting.
The ETUC speaks in favour of collective bargaining as the best method
of obtaining adequate wages and working conditions, but trade unions
cannot always achieve their goals in that way. If that is the case, there is
no other possibility but to rely on legislation. This is obviously the most
relevant option for many European unions. What the ETUC did was
to recognize that different solutions should apply in different national
contexts.
Somewhat later, in the Paris Manifesto, the organization expressed the
following opinion (ETUC 2015b: 8):
The autonomy of the social partners at national and European level must
be respected. We reject interference by public authorities in social dia-
logue, collective bargaining or existing collective agreements. Industrial
relations should be strengthened and collective agreements extended to
cover as many workers as possible, with support for trade union coordi-
nation of collective bargaining.
This might even sound like a condemnation of all kinds of state interven-
tion in the relationship between employers and trade unions, but there is
also another paragraph (before the one quoted) in the same document,
telling something else (ETUC 2015b: 8):
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Statutory minimum wages, where trade unions want them, should be set
with the involvement of social partners. The level of a statutory mini-
mum wage should aim for better standards, as advocated by international
organisations. This, together with collective bargaining, will help to com-
bat in-work poverty, social and wage dumping, and will foster internal
demand. In this context, it is advisable to start discussions on a common
reference for national statutory minimum wages, applicable in countries
where trade unions want them.
Another aspect is that the ETUC does not believe that statutory mini-
mum wages are sufficient to deal with labour-cost competition and in-
work poverty. This is clearly expressed in the action program of 2015
(ETUC 2015a: 33):
Minimum wages alone cannot offer an adequate response to labour-cost
competition and in-work poverty. Strengthening collective bargaining sys-
tems and their coverage is essential to prevent a downward slide in wage.
It is also recognized that it has been difficult to establish robust collec-
tive bargaining institutions in Central/Eastern Europe. Therefore, ‘/i/n
these countries, minimum wages play a more important role than in oth-
ers where well-established industrial relations systems are able to secure
the best deal for workers’; in other words, ‘a balanced and differentiated
approach to minimum wages is needed, respecting national practices and
needs’ (ETUC 2015a: 33).
One important question is where to set the level of statutory mini-
mum wages relative to other wages in a country. As pointed out above, in
December 2011, just before the Copenhagen Winter School in February
2012, Copenhagen, the ETUC stated that the ‘national minimum wage
should be at least equal to 50 per cent of the average wage or 60 per
cent of the median wage’ (ETUC 2011b: 6). There was also an idea of
an ETUC campaign on this topic, but it appears to have been delayed
(Seeliger 2019: 56–57, 61, 163). A more recent ETUC (2018) resolution
on coordination of collective bargaining and wage policies continues on
the same path as before.
The Nordic trade unions have obviously been able to influence the
ETUC’s position on statutory minimum wages. One important factor
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behind this is the Council of Nordic Trade Unions. It has separate gath-
erings to make preparations for ETUC meetings (Seeliger 2019: 169–
170, 212–213, 226). The participating organizations’ discussions aim to
find common positions on various issues and once they are united, they
have been very successful in speaking with one voice. Attempts of such
coordination in other regions have been less effective. When the Nordic
subdivision has agreed on a certain position it is difficult for the ETUC
not to take that very seriously.
Conclusion
The general picture in the above analysis is that Nordic trade unions as
well as some others are sceptical, not to say absolutely against, of statu-
tory minimum wages. This resistance exists in countries without min-
imum wage legislation, while the most affirmative attitudes are found
in nations with such an arrangement. The majority of the unions in
our surveys are located in the latter countries. Typically, they emerge as
positive both on the more general questions and on the more specific
items on advantages/disadvantages regarding statutory minimum wages.
These respondents were mostly confident of claims that legislation is the
best method for unorganized workers to obtain decent wages, that it can
impede wage dumping and that it is a necessary arrangement to prevent
poverty. The opposing unions did not agree very much on these state-
ments. Instead, they were more susceptible to the potential drawbacks
of minimum wage legislation. They tended to think that it undermines
the role of trade unions and that it may lead to lower collectively agreed
wages. A somewhat different outcome showed up on the issue of whether
legislated minimum wages would have a negative impact on unions’ pos-
sibilities of recruiting members. Some responding organizations agreed
with this, but still more concurred only to a low degree or not at all.
This goes for all the unions in our dataset, but the negative summary
indicator for the Nordic unions is much closer to zero than for the other
two categories in our analysis.
Another result is that the three categories of unions distinguished also
differed with respect to the issue whether the ETUC should work for
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common European norms on minimum wages. These results are more
or less in line with expectations. The Nordic unions were most negative,
whereas the other two categories were basically positive, although unions
in countries with statutory minimum wages were so to a greater extent.
A similar pattern emerged on a couple of items dealing with EU mini-
mum wage legislation in our first survey, but in this case the number of
countries and responding unions was much smaller.
Our data indicate that the strongest opposition to minimum wage
legislation comes from Nordic trade unions. Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway and Sweden undoubtedly show some significant similar-
ities making them special compared with other countries, but there are
also differences among them, for example, as mentioned previously, in
regard of the possibility of extending collective agreements by law. A
principal characteristic is that the Nordic countries have well-developed
collective bargaining systems with strong social partners. One indicator
of this is union density, which is high in international comparison. In
2017, Iceland had the highest level with over 90% organized (Visser
2019). The corresponding figures in Denmark, Finland and Sweden were
a bit below 70%. In Norway, union density was around 52%, still much
above what we find in most other countries.
The Nordic bargaining system also has high proportions of employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements. After adjustments for cer-
tain sectors and occupations excluded from the right to bargain, we again
encounter quite high figures: for 2017, 93% in Finland, 89% in Ice-
land and Sweden, 84% in Denmark and 67% in Norway (Visser 2019).
Once more, the Norwegian figure is lower, but it is much higher than for
union density in the country. All five Nordic countries have been shown
to be above the OECD average in terms of collective bargaining coverage
(OECD 2014: 103).
Hence, there are good reasons to distinguish a Nordic model of labour
markets and industrial relations (Chapter 1 in this book; Dølvik 2013;
Ferner and Hyman 1998; Larsson et al. 2012; Traxler et al. 2001; Visser
et al. 2009). The literature also distinguishes four other industrial rela-
tions regimes, but it is not obvious that this classification can contribute
to the analysis of trade union attitudes to statutory minimum wages.
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The divergent opinions within the European trade union movement
have been associated with a great deal of debate. For the ETUC it was
necessary to arrive at a settlement on minimum wages according to which
it is recognized that different solutions are relevant due to national tra-
ditions and circumstances. The organization has even emphasized that
collective agreements represent the best way to obtain good wages and
appropriate working conditions, but that legislation can be necessary
elsewhere (ETUC 2012a, b, 2013, 2015a, b). Most Nordic trade unions
ought to be quite satisfied with the current ETUC compromise, because
its main content is that wage setting should be adjusted to the national
context. They have been able to achieve what they wanted to achieve.
One reason behind this accomplishment is that the Council of Nordic
Trade Unions is an effective sub-organization within the ETUC; it reg-
ularly acts unanimously and it is well-prepared for ETUC meetings
(Seeliger 2019: 169–170, 226). It should be repeated that Nordic trade
unions are characterized by having considerable organizational, struc-
tural and institutional power (cf. Chapter 1; Gumbrell-McCormick and
Hyman 2013: 30–31; Lehndorff et al. 2017). As long as the ETUC com-
promise is valid, trade union cooperation in Europe does not have to
be negatively affected, although it means that the struggle for legislated
minimum wages is not a joint effort of European unions.
It seems that the classification into industrial relations regimes pre-
sented in Chapter 1 is of limited value when we examine trade unions’
views on statutory minimum wages. The Nordic countries represent one
of the five different regimes and in that sense the regime concept is rel-
evant. Including the other four categories does not add much—if any-
thing at all—to the analysis. The cleavage within the European trade
union movement is above all a matter of the gap between the Nordic
unions with their strong organizations and robust collective bargaining
systems and the rest. Hand in hand with this we find lower levels of
inequality and relatively high standards of living in the Nordic region.
The German unions were for a long time rather strong—although not
as strong as the Nordic—but their position was undermined by mem-
ber and power losses and it was then time for another attitude to and
interpretation of the need for minimum wage legislation.
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As mentioned previously, solidarity is a concept that can refer to very
different phenomena (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2001; Hyman
2002). Obviously, the unions that are against minimum wage legislation
focus on what they see as the best for employees in their own coun-
try/countries. It is with them they feel solidarity. The unions that are
in favour of legislation do the same, but they have another country or
other countries in mind. The positive and the negative side more or less
stand against each other, as they feel that the counterpart can negatively
impact on what they have. It has evidently been difficult to bridge the
gap between the two. The ETUC compromise currently appears to be
the only way to handle the cleavage in the European trade union move-
ment.
At present, there is no indication that the Nordic countries would
be about to introduce statutory minimum wages. One reason for this is
that the key trade unions for the most part have a very negative attitude.
It has also been shown that the organizations just below the confeder-
ate level are similarly negative (Furåker 2017). The crucial question is
however what will happen in the long run. There are constantly new
initiatives in Europe to introduce statutory minimum wages. The Laval
verdict by the European Court of Justice some years ago implies certain
drawbacks of not having legislated minima (e.g., Skedinger 2008: 28–29;
Woolfson et al. 2010). Without this kind of regulation, unions’ possibil-
ities of industrial action are circumscribed. We cannot expect the Nordic
collective bargaining model to be extended to other European countries,
because the trade unions in these countries are too weak and show a ten-
dency to become even weaker (Visser 2019). A similar decline also takes
place in the Nordic region and this does not facilitate the spread of their
system with negotiations between strong social partners. Even though the
Council of Nordic Trade Unions weighs heavily in the European arena,
other labour organizations still make up the majority; what the Nordic
unions can do is essentially to fight for the preservation of a collective
bargaining model that so far has served them fairly well.
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Notes
1. The first item in Table 3.1 had the response option ‘Only to a low degree’.
The remaining items presented in this chapter just had the option ‘To a
low degree’.
2. LO is a short form for Landsorganisationen, the large Swedish confedera-
tion for trade unions of manual workers.
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Abstract In 2016, the European Commission proposed a revision of the
Posting of Workers Directive and it led to a great deal of debate, with a
sharp East–West division in the political reactions. The proposal aimed
at eliminating certain kinds of social dumping, arguing that the same
work in the same place would get the same pay. Ministers and parlia-
ments in several Central and East European countries raised their voice
against the revision. Employers’ organizations were generally negative,
while the trade union confederations at European level were positive but
not uncritical; they wanted a more radical reform. No manifest East–
West cleavage became visible in the trade union movement. Even in
countries dismissive of the revision, the main labour organizations sup-
ported the dominant trade union responses.
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Introduction
In the summer of 2018, the revision of the EU Posting of Workers Direc-
tive (PWD) was adopted by the European Council after more than two
years of debate (Directive 2018; Van Nuffel and Afanasjeva 2018). It had
then already been approved by the European Parliament. The amend-
ments modified the balance between, on the one hand, EU freedom of
providing services and, on the other, its legislation supporting the pro-
tection of workers. The debate that preceded the final decisions was quite
intense and involved the European Commission, the EU Parliament, EU
Member States, the main organizations of the social partners as well as
others. The whole issue was very much a matter of social dumping for
the trade unions.
The EU rules regarding posting of workers mean that companies from
any Member State can win tenders in any other Member State. The origi-
nal Directive lets companies use lower wages to be competitive, although
it postulated a number of restrictions. Still, the arrangement allowed
them pretty good chances to increase their market shares and profits, but
also to provide more jobs and make jobs more secure for their workers. In
this way, there were benefits to reap for both employers and employees,
possibly entailing social dumping.
Social dumping is a frequently debated concern in the EU, not least in
connection with the enlargement with Central/Eastern European coun-
tries. As these Member States generally have lower wage levels and less
favourable working conditions than is the case in particularly the North-
ern, Central/Western and Western parts of Europe, there are differences
for various actors to exploit. Notably, a similar discussion took place sev-
eral years earlier in connection with the entry of Greece, Portugal and
Spain as EU Member States (e.g., Bernaciak 2012: 10–12; 2014: 21–23;
Voss et al. 2016: 21).
When the European Commission (2016c) in March 2016 proposed
a revision of the PWD, questions related to social dumping came into
focus. A stated ambition in the proposal was that posted workers should
be subject to the same rules as local workers. It can then be asked with
whom trade unions in different countries feel solidarity. Is it above all
with trade unions in other countries or with their national companies or
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maybe their home nation? We will examine how various actors and in
particular trade unions—both in the sending and in the hosting coun-
tries—reacted to the Commission’s suggestion of reducing the differences
in employment and working conditions between local and posted work-
ers. If the Central/Eastern European organizations regarded the existing
system of posting of workers in the EU as advantageous, we could expect
them to be against the suggested revision of the PWD. This implies the
idea that their interests are best served if they can compete with lower
wages, which is presumably unacceptable for unions in other parts of
Europe. Thus, the new proposal might pave the way for a conflict or a
tension that could be detrimental to transnational trade union coopera-
tion.
The structure of the chapter is the following. First, there is a short
description of the phenomenon of posting of workers. Then a section
comes on key concepts such as social dumping and solidarity. It is fol-
lowed by a brief presentation of the first PWD from 1996 and the asso-
ciated Enforcement Directive (ED) from 2014. After that we outline
the main features of the European Commission’s proposal to change the
PWD. The main research question is what to expect from trade unions
concerning this proposal. To provide some background, we give some
examples of what has happened in other contexts. Trade unions can have
different loyalties and it cannot be taken for granted whether they will be
in solidarity with their own companies’ opportunities for development,
with their own country’s economic interests or with trade unions in other
countries. The empirical basis for the analysis is the reactions on the pro-
posed revision of the PWD from the political scene and from the social
partners. Our focus is on trade unions—due to our concern with the
conditions for cross-border trade union cooperation—but we will look
at their reactions in relation to other actors’ responses. Finally, we sum-
marize and interpret the empirical results and discuss their implications
for cross-border trade union cooperation.
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What DoWe Know about Posting of Workers
in Europe?
For several years posting seemed to be a very marginal phenomenon
(European Commission 2016a: Annex II; De Wispelaere and Pacolet
2018; Voss et al. 2016: 14–20). Eventually there was some substantial
increase but from a very low level. Still in 2017, it was only a tiny frac-
tion of total EU employment.
The first PWD from 1996 contains a definition of the concept of
posted worker; Article 2.1 says that the term denotes someone ‘who,
for a limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a Mem-
ber State other than the State in which he normally works’ (Directive
96/71/EC). The information available is rather uncertain, but one data
source commonly used to describe the phenomenon is the information
on the Portable Documents A1 (PDs A1), required to establish ‘that the
holder is properly affiliated to the social security system of the Member
State which has issued the certificate’ (De Wispelaere and Pacolet 2018:
12). When it comes to social security coordination in the EU, a crucial
principle is that individuals ‘are subject to the legislation of a single Mem-
ber State only’ (De Wispelaere and Pacolet 2018: 8). The PDs A1 cover
somewhat different categories of persons. The most important category
includes those who are covered by Article 12 of the Basic Regulation
(Regulation 2004). These persons ‘are posted by an employer to another
Member State to perform work’ or they can be self-employed ‘who go to
pursue a similar activity in another Member State’ (De Wispelaere and
Pacolet 2018: 12). There is also a smaller, but increasing, category of PDs
A1 issued according to Article 13 of the Basic Regulation; these certifi-
cates refer to employees or self-employed who work in two or more EU
Member States. It should be noted that the number of posted individuals
is lower than the number of PDs A1, because a person can have several
certificates during a year.
The most recent examination of these data refers to 2017. Data are
available for EU Member States, but also for Iceland, Lichtenstein, Nor-
way and Switzerland. In 2017, the PDs A1 were calculated to correspond
to 1.2% of total employment in the EU. This meant an increase over
the previous year with over 22% and compared to five years earlier with
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almost 84%. The largest numbers of PDs A1 were issued in Poland and
Germany with more than 533,000 and almost 400,000 respectively (De
Wispelaere and Pacolet 2018: 21, Table 4). These two countries have
been at the top for several years. In third and fourth place we find Spain
and Slovenia, each with approximately 190,000 PDs A1. Compared to
2016, Germany had an increase of almost 54% and compared to 2012
its increase was about 64%. The corresponding figures for Poland were
roughly 12 and 68%.
On the receiving side Germany and France show the highest numbers,
with Belgium as third. The largest net senders (according to Article 12)
in 2017 were Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia and the largest net recipients
were France and Germany, followed by a number of countries that were
close to each other: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
The most interesting aspect for the purpose of the current chapter is
to what extent the flows go from low-wage to high-wage countries.1 In
this respect, we focus on information about PDs A1 given out accord-
ing to Article 12 of the Basic Regulation (De Wispelaere and Pacolet
2018: 27, Figure 8). Notably, during 2017, the clearly largest category
of postings happened between high-wage countries. It made up about
40% of the totals. The most relevant flow here—from low-wage to high-
wage countries—was the second largest category. It accounted for slightly
more than 29% of the total transitions. In third place there was the cate-
gory moving from medium-wage to high-wage countries (almost 18%).
All other flow types were small. There is also information about the PDs
A1 issued in 2017 (under Article 12) on sector of activity. Approximately
47% of the postings then occurred within construction (De Wispelaere
and Pacolet 2018: 31, Table 9). Two sectors—the service sector and other
industrial activities (i.e., with construction excluded)—had roughly 26–
27%.
It is more difficult to get an exhaustive picture of the duration of
postings, because these data are available only for a limited number of
countries. For 2017, we have access to information for 17 countries that
issued PDs A1 under Article 12 (De Wispelaere and Pacolet 2018: 34,
Table 12). The weighted average was 98 days. There is a wide spread
between the countries: low figures for Luxembourg and France (less than
a month) and high for Estonia, Ireland, Croatia, Latvia, Hungary and
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Finland (over 200 days). It should be repeated that a person can be sent
more than once during a year.
Key Concepts
With increasing international competition, the concept of social dump-
ing often gets a central place in the debate. Through the EU enlarge-
ment to the East with former socialist countries it has been very much a
matter of the East–West relationship. Magdalena Bernaciak (2016: 510)
has identified three aspects of this EU enlargement making the fear of
social dumping relevant. The first is the opening-up for Western capi-
tal to invest in low-wage Central/Eastern European countries, either by
moving existing companies or by starting new businesses there. All such
investments cannot be described as social dumping, but some of them
can. The second aspect is intra-EU mobility of labour allowing people
to move from the East to the West and in the new country work for
lower pay and under inferior working conditions than others. Finally,
companies can temporarily offer services in any other EU Member State,
which thus means posting of workers. The PWD sets up certain limits
to how wage levels and working conditions can deviate from those in the
host country, and the revision of it is about making the rules stricter for
posting companies.
We must keep in mind that the phenomenon of social dumping is not
limited to a cross-national dimension; it has a much wider application
and may very well take place within a country or even within a single
company (Bernaciak 2014: 25). This chapter, however, concentrates on
the cross-national dimension, due to our interest in the possibilities and
difficulties for transnational trade union cooperation.
The concept of social dumping has value-related connotations that are
unquestionably negative, but its theoretical meaning is frequently unclear
or unspecified. As a consequence, many different interpretations may
be implicated. Vague concepts can have a major political and ideolog-
ical impact, sometimes perhaps precisely because of their lack of clarity.
It is obvious that there is a need for theoretical and conceptual clari-
fication. Some authors have taken on this task, for example Bernaciak
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(2012, 2014, 2015). In developing her definition, she criticizes several
other scholarly uses of the concept. There is, for example, a tendency
to confuse lower wages and inferior employment with social dumping
and ‘unfair’ competition. It is moreover common to mix positive and
normative elements and to take the standards in high-wage countries as
universal frames of reference. Another problem is that many studies are
single-case studies, which may not even appear to be related to the same
phenomena. In an attempt to ‘avoid normative traps and to bring dif-
ferent manifestations under a common analytical umbrella’, Bernaciak
(2014: 16) defines the key concept as ‘the practice, undertaken by self-
interested market participants, of undermining or evading existing social
regulations with the aim of gaining a short-term advantage over their
competitors’.
This is a helpful clarification, but some remarks are justified. It seems
that the word ‘self-interested’ is redundant in Bernaciak’s definition; it
should be sufficient to say that the actors’ aim is to gain advantage over
others. In addition, the word ‘short-term’ also appears to be a dispensable
limitation. The argument that speaks for including it is that competition
is a relative affair. If someone engages in social dumping, others may
soon follow suit with the result that the advantages gained by the first
actor simply vanish. This is undeniably a realistic scenario, but there can
nonetheless be situations in which dumping companies and companies
abiding by norms and regulations exist side by side for a longer period
of time. It can still be beneficial for the latter to avoid a ‘race to the
bottom’, for example because of the advantage that lies in maintaining
cooperative relations with unions. Likewise, it remains an open question
where to draw the line between ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’. A perhaps
more important observation is brought up by Jens Arnholtz and Line
Eldring (2015: 82–83). They note that the concept of ‘social regulations’
in Bernaciak’s definition presupposes some kind of norm. Therefore
we need to examine how these norms are created and become guiding
principles.
A valuable contribution has been made by Annette Thörnquist (2013,
2015) in her analyses of false self-employment (which is rather common,
for example, in construction, cleaning, road haulage and certain other
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industries) as a form of social dumping. Genuine self-employment theo-
retically means that workers are the owners of their means of production,
that they work independently and that they provide goods or services
to several clients (Adlercreutz 1964: 6–7). In reality, however, we often
find a grey zone in which formally self-employed persons work for only
one principal. These persons are subject to conditions similar to those of
dependent employees but without having the same rights and protection
defined in labour law or through collective agreements. Such arrange-
ments may represent a way of evading certain regulations and hence of
lowering labour costs and for that reason they must be regarded as cases
of social dumping. Thörnquist (2013: 5; 2015: 414) points out that the
method is being used both as a mode of exploitation in the capital–labour
relationship and as a strategy for survival among workers. This is unde-
niably an important qualification to be taken into account and it is fully
in line with Bernaciak’s concept according to which different kinds of
‘market participants’ can resort to social dumping.
Acceptance of a wage reduction or of lower standards in other respects
can no doubt be a way for employees to protect their jobs. If their work-
place is threatened by downsizing or closure it may be a necessity for
continued existence. Another case might be when firms from low-wage
countries sidestep rules and norms to win contracts in countries with
higher wages; in that way new employment opportunities can be cre-
ated for their staff. A corresponding reasoning can be applied to job
seekers. They sometimes agree to lower wages and/or inferior working
conditions than normal just to get a job at all; otherwise they have no
income to live on. For example, undocumented immigrants frequently
accept much worse conditions than other employees in the country they
have moved to, merely to secure survival. Social dumping may thus be
a matter of protecting existing jobs as well as a way of creating new job
opportunities.
For employers, a simple motive for engaging in social dumping is to
increase profits. Such behaviour is associated with two possible advan-
tages for them. On the one hand, if prices are kept the same, it is likely
to lead to a greater surplus and, on the other hand, if prices are lowered
it is possible to obtain a larger share of the market. In the first case profits
can be expected to increase rather quickly and in the second case they will
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supposedly be higher and/or more secure in the future. In other words,
the choice of strategy may be a matter of different time horizons. Fur-
thermore, also for companies, social dumping can be a matter of securing
survival. A company threatened by bankruptcy may have an urgent need
to cut costs and one way to achieve this is to lower wages and/or to
degrade working conditions.
Susanne Pernicka and her collaborators (2015) have argued that stress-
ing economic interests and utility maximization does not make justice to
trade unions’ social ties with other unions and their commitment to sol-
idarity values and norms. They consider the notion of solidarity ‘a uni-
versal principle’ for trade unions, ‘based on the common interests of all
workers’ (Pernicka et al. 2015: 3). In accordance with these statements
it is claimed that we need a neo-institutionalist perspective to pay atten-
tion to values and norms and to specify institutional orders and processes
(additionally, see Pernicka and Glassner 2012, 2014).
The concept of solidarity is not really discussed in the above-
mentioned publications by Pernicka and colleagues. Rebecka Gumbrell-
McCormick and Richard Hyman (2015; Hyman 2002) have provided
some useful insights into the complexities of the concept by outlining
different interpretations of it. The first version takes its starting point
in shared identity, which means that people have certain characteristics
in common; they can be members of a nation, a tribe or a social class
and this may create a sense of belonging and loyalty. The second under-
standing presupposes awareness that common interests are best taken
care of collectively. For trade unions it is evident that employees’ interests
must be pursued by a collective organization. Solidarity is then founded
on both the objective conditions and the perception of these. There is
also a third interpretation of solidarity as ‘mutuality despite difference’,
which can be ‘a sense of interdependence’ or ‘an expression of the obliga-
tions of humanity’ (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2015: 2; italics
removed). This third meaning can be taken to lean towards charity.
Yet another distinction suggested by Gumbrell-McCormick and
Hyman (2015: 2) is that between solidarity with and solidarity against.
This implies conflict and may therefore be less relevant for the third con-
cept above (‘mutuality despite difference’). In contrast, a typical example
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of how the conflict perspective can be relevant is when workers feel soli-
darity with one another and against employers. Having a clear counter-
part—especially if this actor is perceived as antagonistic—can certainly
strengthen cohesion among workers.
For trade unions, a core principle is to avoid underbidding among
workers. If some workers ask for less pay than others for the same kind
of work, it is difficult to make joint demands against employers. Under-
bidding represents a threat to the possibilities of keeping up wage levels
and other employment and working conditions. A measure of solidarity
is a key factor for success, but cohesion within and between unions can
be exposed to strains, not least in international context where national
interests may overthrow other considerations. Divisions between trade
unions are likely to be detrimental to transnational trade union cooper-
ation, which is the underlying concern in our analysis. It is important to
note that solidarity can go in different directions. The aim of this chapter
is to examine a set of circumstances where this might be the case.
The Directives of 1996 and 2014
Posting of workers is allowed according to the four freedoms of mobility
in the EU—of goods, services, labour and capital. The freedom of pro-
viding services in the internal EU market was ensured by the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, but there was a need for some
further regulation.
The first directive on posting of workers was implemented by the EU
in 1996 (Directive 96/71/EC). We have already seen how the Directive
defined the term ‘posted worker’. The PWD was aimed at providing a
set of common rules for postings and guarantees for ‘a level playing field
for businesses’. Although its general preamble mentions ‘respect for the
rights of workers’, it was not oriented towards safeguarding that posted
workers be treated the same way or get equal pay as workers in the host
country (Voss et al. 2016: 22). However, a ‘hard core’ of rights as defined
‘by law, regulation or administrative provision’ concerning employment
and working conditions must be followed (Directive 96/71/EC: Article
3.1). In the construction sector, and in other sectors if Member States
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so decided, the hard core could also be defined by ‘collective agreements
or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable’
(Directive 96/71/EC: Article 3.1). The rights included rules regarding
issues such as minimum rates of pay, maximum work periods, a mini-
mum of rest periods, a minimum of paid annual holidays and regulations
on health, safety and hygiene at work as well as non-discrimination.
The regulations of the conditions for posted workers have given rise
to a great deal of debate, for example about the existence of ‘unfair’
competition, fraudulent practices, circumvention of regulations and the
difficulties of ensuring a level playing field. Various actors have shown a
significant inventiveness in these respects. For example, we find ‘letter-
box’ companies established in low-wage countries just to enable post-
ing of low-paid workers in high-wage countries. In 2014 the PWD was
therefore supplemented with the ED (Directive 2014/67/EU), the pur-
pose of which was to combat various forms of abuse and to strengthen
the practical application of regulations regarding posting of workers. The
ED was not initiated to obtain another definition of the hard core or to
remedy the inconsistencies between the PWD and the national social
security systems. Its objective was to increase transparency, facilitate con-
trols and guarantee the application of penalties and the collection of
fines, should such measures be justified.
The European Commission’s Proposal
As mentioned, the European Commission (2016b) proposed a revision
of the PWD in March 2016. The ETUC (2010) had then for many
years demanded ‘a framework of firm and fair rules, combining open
borders and adequate protection of workers’. It seems that the Commis-
sion was in a similar way of thinking. The existing rules required posting
companies to abide by a set of core rights in the host Member State
(see further below), in which workers may have higher standards. This
means that employers were obliged to pay the receiving nations’ statu-
tory minimum wages. Nevertheless, there could be large wage differences
between posted and local workers, because the latter were often paid well
above the minima. To put it in another way words, wage dumping could
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become a reality. The Commission’s proposal included several measures
to change this.
The original PWD was directed to providing a regulatory framework
for the transnational provision of services. According to the Commission,
it should guarantee fair competition among businesses (a ‘level playing
field’) and respect workers’ rights, but the latter objective was not given
top priority. The revision was aimed at remedying deficiencies in the
existing regulations. In its work program for 2016, the Juncker Commis-
sion announced that it would ‘present a targeted revision of the Posting
of Workers Directive to address unfair practices leading to social dump-
ing and brain drain by ensuring that the same work in the same place is
rewarded by the same pay’ (European Commission 2015: 8). In a press
release in 2016, it was emphasized that the economic and labour market
situation had changed significantly since 1996 and with the expansion
of the single market, wage differences had increased, ‘thereby creating
unwanted incentives to use posting as a means to exploit these differ-
ences’ (European Commission 2016b: 7). It was moreover argued that
this development altered the level playing field between companies, with
a negative impact on the functioning of the single market. There was also
an ambition to improve the PWD’s consistency with other parts of EU
legislation like the Temporary Agency Work Directive and Regulation
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems.
The Commission proposed changes in the PWD in regard of three
main topics: remuneration of posted workers; rules on temporary agency
workers; and long-term posting. Remuneration is a wider concept than
the PWD’s concept of minimum rates of pay. It includes other elements
such as bonuses and pay increases due to seniority. The goal of the
proposal was that there should be the same rules of remuneration for
posted and local workers, given that these rules are defined by law or by
‘universally applicable collective agreements’. Moreover, the Commission
suggested that the rules established by ‘universally applicable collective
agreements’ should be extended to posted workers in all economic sectors
and not only to those in the construction sector. In addition, Member
States would have the possibility of applying the same regulations in case
of subcontracting.
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Another important part of the proposal was that posted temporary
agency workers must be treated the same way as local temporary agency
workers. The objective was to create equality between posted and local
employees. The current EU legislation required that domestic agency
workers be subject to the same conditions as their colleagues in the user
company. The proposal thus wanted to extend this principle also to those
posted by temporary work agencies from other Member States.
A further suggestion was that postings lasting longer than 24 months
should make workers subject to the labour laws of the host Member
State. This was already the case according to the social security legisla-
tion, but the principle would hence be extended to labour law. For exam-
ple, after two years a posted worker should be protected against ‘unfair’
dismissal if the host country has such legislation, no matter whether or
not the home country has any such legal provisions.
After more than two years of debates, the revision of the PWD was
approved, when both the European Parliament and the European Coun-
cil adopted it. The revised PWD is to be transposed into national laws
by the end of July 2020 and it cannot be applied before that date. The
final version is broadly in line with the Commission’s original proposal,
although some changes were made. One such change was that labour
market rules in the host country apply earlier than the Commission had
proposed. When a posting has lasted for 12 months, with the possibil-
ity of an extension with 6 months, the posting company must follow
the labour laws in the hosting country. As noted above, this time limit
was 24 months in the Commission’s original proposal. We could observe
that the revised PWD does not apply to the transport sector, which often
has a cross-border character. For this sector the 1996 Directive is still in
force. The current chapter is mainly concerned with the discussions that
took place after the Commission had published its plan.
It could be expected that the Commission’s proposal would encounter
different reactions among various actors. To some extent these reactions
could be predicted, but it was not so obvious what the answers from
trade unions would be. The quotation below illustrates some responses
among trade unions in connection with recent EU enlargements and the
EU principles of freedom of movement of goods, capital, services and
labour:
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While unions in Western Europe focused on the risk of social dumping,
their counterparts in the East welcomed unrestricted access to Western
labour markets. This is not to say, however, that the latter supported
cost-based competition. In relation to the free movement of workers, they
insisted that the nationals of new member states should work in EU15 for
the same wages as domestic employees. In the mid-2000s, they manifested
their anti-social dumping position by joining an EU-level mobilisation
drive against the draft Services directive … Justifying their stance, they
argued that they did not want to be the cause of ‘unfair’ competition with
fellow workers in the West. (Bernaciak et al. 2014: 70)
A principal rationale behind trade unionism is that workers should avoid
underbidding each other. This means that they should make agree-
ments with their employers collectively—through their organizations—
instead of each employee doing so individually. Thereby dumping can
be avoided, but it becomes more complicated in an international setting
when two or more trade unions, often subject to very different circum-
stances, are involved. What happens when jobs are at stake in different
countries? Can conflicts between trade unions then be avoided? By look-
ing at some previous cases, when transnational union solidarity has been
put to the test, we can get a glimpse of what might be expected.
Examples of Cross-Border Trade Union Rivalry
and Cooperation
A frequently referenced case of social dumping is what happened in
Vaxholm, Sweden, in 2004. The Latvian company Laval un Partneri
had won a contract at a construction site by paying much lower wages
than normal for Swedish construction workers. Hence, the Swedish trade
union Byggnads demanded that the company should sign a Swedish col-
lective agreement. Laval then signed two agreements with the parallel
trade union in Latvia, still however with much lower pay rates than
in the host country. In response thereto, Byggnads began a blockade of
Laval, with some sympathy actions from other Swedish trade unions,
and the company eventually went bankrupt. The issue was brought to
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the European Court of Justice with support from the Confederation of
Swedish Enterprise. The Court found that the Swedish unions had the
right to take action, but that their actions were not in proportion to the
matters concerned. A crucial aspect was also that the unions could not
invoke a statutory minimum wage, as Sweden has no such arrangement
(cf. Chapter 3 in this book).
There is no need here to go further into the legal aspects of the Laval
case (for details, see, e.g., Ahlberg et al. 2006; Bücker andWarneck 2010;
Woolfson et al. 2010); the point to be made is just that trade unions may
end up in viewing social dumping from very different positions. Despite
the question at issue, the relationship between Byggnads and the Latvian
counterpart never became hostile, but perhaps a little cooler. When our
research team interviewed an official at the Swedish organization in 2011
(Lovén Seldén 2014: 94), he said that the relationship with the Latvian
union had deteriorated for a while at the time of the conflict. This sit-
uation had no longer duration. Actually Byggnads had for several years
provided various kinds of organizational assistance to the Latvians and
continued to offer support also after the turmoil created by the Laval
events. We also made an e-mail interview with a representative of LBAS,
the Latvian peak trade union. The interviewee emphasized that the coop-
eration with Byggnads had progressed in recent times. Already in 2005
LBAS and the Swedish confederate organization LO signed an agreement
‘to explore the idea of solidarity and to strengthen cooperation between
both organizations’ (Lovén Seldén 2014: 94, Note 38).
Other Swedish unionists interviewed by our research team in 2011
talked about the Laval quartet verdicts functioning as an alarm clock.
It meant that it would be necessary for the trade unions to work more
actively with unions from other countries and with lobbying in Brussels.
The respondents also emphasized the important role of the Swedish trade
union office in Brussels and of personal networks and good personal rela-
tions. In other words, although the Laval experience must be seen as a
defeat, it appears to have had some positive effects on transnational trade
union cooperation.
An important distinction is that between central-level and plant-level
cooperation among trade unions. Bernaciak (2011) shows this by com-
paring union responses to the EU draft Service Directive and their
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actions with respect to investments and jobs at GM/Opel factories. The
two settings provided very different preconditions. In the first case, it
was a matter of contacts between top-level unionists in various countries,
whereas plant-level unionists were directly involved in the GM/Opel
affairs. Moreover, the issue of the EU draft Service Directive was about
outlining a declaration and not about making prompter decisions over
investments and jobs. The Directive could no doubt have long-term con-
sequences for work opportunities and living standards, but the rivalries
between the GM/Opel factories had an immediate relation to the situa-
tion for the workers concerned. In spite of the tough competition in the
latter situation, it was possible for the trade unions to establish concrete
cross-border commitments and links.
Other examples may also be worth considering. Transnational trade
union cooperation is generally more likely to develop in multinational
companies (MNCs) (e.g., Arrowsmith and Marginson 2006; Bieler
2005), but this does not exclude the rise of inter-plant rivalries in MNCs
making such cooperation difficult. We find illustrations of trade union
cooperation and rivalry in the competition between European GM/Opel
automotive plants some years ago (Andersen 2006; Banyuls et al. 2008;
Bernaciak 2010, 2011, 2013; Gajewska 2008; Pernicka et al. 2015). The
company was trying to handle its long-lasting problems with profitabil-
ity in different ways, among other things, by arranging bidding matches
between plants.
One case is the contest over the Opel Zafira model between two
GM/Opel plants: one in Gliwice in Poland and the other in Rüsselsheim
in Germany (Bernaciak 2010: 124–126; 2011: 36–38; Pernicka et al.
2015: 12). Evidently, the chances for winning were related to work-
ers’ claims regarding employment and working conditions. The estab-
lishment in Gliwice already had an advantage over the establishment in
Rüsselsheim by having considerably lower labour costs. In addition to
this, the Polish plant-level trade union—a unit of Solidarność—signed
a concession agreement with the local management including a three-
year wage freeze and lower wages for new recruits. As a consequence, the
Gliwice factory obtained the largest part of the production of the Zafira
model.
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Transnational worker solidarity was definitely put to the test, but
cooperation between Polish and German trade unions could neverthe-
less develop. After the investment had been made in Gliwice, Solidarność
started to prioritize wage increases and improvement of working condi-
tions and then received support from their colleagues in the West. It was
important for the Germans with coordination with the Poles to avoid
underbidding. The Polish unionists, for their part, had something to
achieve from being cooperative, as in exchange they could receive var-
ious kinds of assistance.
GM/Opel’s European Works Council (EWC)2 played an impor-
tant role in relation to the company’s restructuring efforts, to some
extent successfully restraining trade union rivalries (Banyuls et al. 2008;
Bernaciak 2013: 142–143; Gajewska 2008; Pernicka et al. 2015: 11–
12). In 2005, a union committee was set up to avoid ‘beauty contests’
between five European plants—in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden
and the UK—as to the selection for the production of the Opel Astra
model. It was called the ‘Joint Delta Working Group’ and the members
soon signed the ‘European Solidarity Pledge’, demanding fairness in the
distribution of investments and assuring that they would not hold sep-
arate dialogues with management at the various sites (Bernaciak 2010:
125–126). Still it appears that the British unionists broke the agreement
by having negotiations with and making concessions to the Ellesmere
Port management (Pernicka et al. 2015: 13–14). Moreover, within the
Delta Group, Solidarność continued to argue for further resources to
Poland on the basis of competitive advantages (Bernaciak 2010: 125–
126). In addition, participation in East–West trade union cooperation
did not prevent the Gliwice unionists from engaging in a competition
with the Zaragoza plant in Spain over another Opel model (Meriva).
As described by several authors (e.g., Andersen 2006: 38–39;
Pernicka et al. 2015: 12), there was a similar bidding contest between the
GM/Opel factories in Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan, Sweden, concerning
the Vectra model. In 2004, together with the European Metalworkers’
Federation, the German and Swedish unions rejected this competition
in the joint so-called Copenhagen Declaration (EMF 2004). Despite
some twists on the thread, this shared effort indicates that trade unions
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can bring about transnational cooperation even under competitive con-
ditions.
According to Bernaciak (2010: 121–122) ‘cross-border union coordi-
nation can be regarded as a joint effort to minimize competitive pressure
on national workforces, rather than exercising transnational solidarity’.
For Pernicka et al. (2015), in spite of some indications to the contrary,
the GM/Opel rivalries prove that transnational trade union solidarity can
prevail also in highly competitive settings. On the other hand, even if
labour actors believe in ‘solidarity as a universal principle’, they ‘still have
to accept that their ability (and willingness) to enforce labour coopera-
tion and solidarity beyond national or company borders is rather limited’
(Pernicka et al. 2015: 20).
Trade unions are certainly strategic and interest-based actors that are
continuously weighing costs and benefits, but their strategic orientations
are constrained or facilitated by the structural and institutional settings
in which they operate. The generalizability of the examples above may
be discussed, but they show that there can be both rivalry and coopera-
tion between unions in different countries. It was thus an open question
what union responses could be expected to the Commission’s proposed
revision of the PWD.
DoWe Find an East–West Conflict
over the Commission’s Proposal?
Following the publication of the Commission’s proposal to revise the
PWD there were many reactions. Some of the participants in the debate
were simply negative, as they found no reasonable ground for the revi-
sion. In contrast, others welcomed the initiative but were therefore not
automatically uncritical. An overriding question for us was whether we
would find an East–West disagreement on the suggested reform. In the
presentation of various responses below, we start with the political scene.
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Political Reactions
In 2015, the year before the publishing of her proposal, Commissioner
Marianne Thyssen received two letters from two different groups of
countries (Voss et al. 2016: 51). The senders of the first one were the
labour ministers in a group of high-wage countries (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden). They
demanded a significant change of the PWD that should be governed
by the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’. In their
eyes it was necessary to create a better balance between economic and
social standards and to avoid social dumping. The second letter came
from ministers responsible for labour and social affairs in a group of
low-wage countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). It expressed very different
arguments. Their contention was that a revision of the PWD would be
premature; first, ‘a proper assessment’ had to be carried out concerning
the impact of the ED. Moreover, a revision of the PWD could have very
negative effects on the freedom to provide services.
After the publication of the Commission’s proposal, the parliaments
in the same EU Members States plus Croatia and Denmark showed a
‘yellow card’ to the European Commission for its suggestion to revise
the PWD (Voss et al. 2016: 53–54).3 Denmark was an exception in this
group of countries; its reported motive was just that the reform collided
with the subsidiarity principle. The Danish parliament actually empha-
sized that an important objective would be to ensure equal pay for equal
work and that the proposal would help to avoid social dumping. The
other ten countries all belong to the relatively new Central/Eastern Euro-
pean Member States and they were all negative to the planned revision,
also invoking its incompatibility with the notion of subsidiarity.
A few other parliamentary responses (from Italy, Portugal and Spain)
conveyed positive opinions over the Commission’s proposal (Voss et al.
2016: 53). It should be noted that the European Parliament had not
yet declared a unified view about the proposal, but among the politi-
cal groups the clearest positions were taken by the Group of Socialists
and Democrats and the European Conservatives and Reformists Group
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(Voss et al. 2016: 52). The first assembly was positive and the second was
negative.
The European Commission responded rather quickly to the yel-
low card procedure. Its main conclusion in the press release was that
the proposal on the PWD revision ‘does not constitute a breach with
the subsidiarity principle’ and Commissioner Thyssen was cited, saying
the following: ‘We have carefully analysed all arguments put forward by
national Parliaments and discussed their concerns with them. All things
considered, we have concluded that our proposal fully complies with
the principle of subsidiarity and we will therefore maintain it. Posting
of workers is a cross-border issue by nature. The Juncker Commission
remains firmly committed to the free movement of people on the basis
of rules that are clear, fair for everybody and enforced on the ground’
(European Commission 2016d).
Briefly summarizing the political reactions to the planned revision of
the PWD, we must conclude that the data reveal a rather distinct East–
West conflict. It is above all in Central/Eastern European countries that
we could observe negative attitudes to the Commission’s proposal. Var-
ious opinions against the proposal were put forward. It was assessed as
reasonable to wait and see what the effects of the ED from 2014 turned
out to be. More importantly, there was also a worry that the new Mem-
ber States would lose competitive advantages and that the freedom of
providing services would be circumvented. A more formalistic point of
view was that the reform would interfere with the subsidiarity princi-
ple. Other political actors—for example, some parliaments in Southern
Europe and the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Par-
liament—were positive to the suggested revision of the PWD.
The Social Partners’ Responses
BusinessEurope, the main European confederation on the employer
side, and a number of national employer organizations in Poland, the
Czech Republic, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia and Ire-
land expressed already in 2015, when the European Commission had
announced its decision on a ‘targeted review’ of the PWD, that the
4 Revision of the EU Posting of Workers Directive … 129
revision would go too far in restraining economic freedoms (Voss et al.
2016: 49). There was also a letter sent to the Commission from Nordic
employer organizations, worrying about the consequences of the princi-
ple ‘equal pay for equal work at the same place’ for national collective
bargaining systems (Voss et al. 2016: 49; italics removed).
When the European Commission’s proposal was published, Busi-
nessEurope declared that it could see no satisfactory reason for a revision
of the PWD (Voss et al. 2016: 72). The scheme was assumed to damage
the freedom of providing services in the European market, by under-
cutting the competitive ability of companies crossing borders. A further
argument brought forward was that the most important task would now
be to fight illegal practices and for this purpose the ED was expected to
be a useful tool.
Another sceptical organization was the European Construction Indus-
try Federation (FIEC) (Voss et al. 2016: 73–74). It was doubtful to the
added value of the proposal. In 2015, it had authored a joint state-
ment with the European Federations of Building and Wood Workers
(EFBWW) in which a number of suggestions were put on the table
regarding how to avoid abuse. In spite of its distrustful attitude, FIEC
found it reasonable that posted temporary agency workers were treated
in the same way as such workers in the host country.
The European Confederation of Private Employment Services
(EUROCIETT) was yet another organization that disagreed with the
revision of the PWD (Voss et al. 2016: 74). It supported the principle of
equal pay for equal work as defined in the EU Directive on temporary
work agencies, but argued that 16 Member States had already adopted
this principle and that it was an option available for everyone. Instead of
revising the PWD, the Commission should focus on getting full impact
for the ED.
Interestingly, there was also one employer organization welcoming the
European Commission’s proposal, namely the European Building Con-
federation (EBC) which represents small and medium-sized enterprises
in the construction industry (Voss et al. 2016: 74). The EBC pointed
out that smaller companies were generally disfavoured by unfair compe-
tition. It thus appreciated a change that could help to eliminate exploita-
tion based on wage differentials.
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Turning to the trade union side, we find two organizations to be par-
ticularly active in relation to the revision of the PWD: the ETUC and
the EFBWW (representing workers in the construction sector, the largest
industry for postings). As mentioned above, when the Commission’s pro-
posal was published in 2016, the ETUC had for many years advocated
that the PWD would be revised and unsurprisingly it thus belonged to
the welcoming category of actors (ETUC 2016; Voss et al. 2016: 72).
This does not mean, though, that the organization considered the pro-
posal sufficient; it had a series of objections. The ETUC endorsed that
the concept of minimum rates of pay would be replaced by the broader
concept of remuneration, but at the same time it demanded a clear state-
ment in the PWD that competition with labour costs should not occur
in connection with postings. The main argument was furthermore that
the proposal contained a too narrow definition of the kind of collective
agreements that would be applicable. It was claimed that also sectoral
and even company-level agreements must be accepted; otherwise, there
would be equal pay only for some posted workers.
Another criticism concerned the Commission’s suggestion that when
postings had lasted 24 months, national law should be applicable. It is
unusual that postings exceed two years, which apparently has to do with
‘the restrictions on social security contributions’. In addition, the Com-
mission’s proposal left the possibility open for bypassing the time limit.
According to the ETUC, the maximum duration of posting should be
decided by the host Member State in discussions and negotiations with
the social partners.
The ETUC also called for the introduction of a mandatory liability
mechanism concerning subcontracting. In regard of temporary agency
workers, it was insisted that they be treated in the same way as tempo-
rary agency workers in the host country. It was furthermore considered
necessary that they had a previous period of employment in that country;
if not, they must be treated as being regularly employed there.
The EFBWW had similar comments to the Commission’s proposal. It
welcomed the extension of the PWD to all sectors as well as the intro-
duction of the concept of remuneration. Like the ETUC, the EFBWW
wanted no restriction on the kind of collective agreements that would be
valid. This means that the national systems of industrial relations must
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be respected. On the maximum duration of posting, it was noticed that
the 24-month limit was exceptionally long and far from the average.
A fact worth being observed is that the member unions from the Cen-
tral/Eastern Europe in the ETUC and EFBWW agreed with the posi-
tions taken by these confederations. The internal discussions are not
made public, but no opposition has been reported. Does this mean that
there was no East–West tension in the trade union movement as to the
revision of the PWD? Actually, we have found no evidence speaking in
favour of any severe such tension. Six main trade unions in the Viseg-
rad group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) wel-
comed the Commission’s proposal (Joint Statement 2017). They under-
lined how important it was to create a level playing field for all actors
involved. Fair competition for companies and equal rights for workers
were deemed indispensable. In particular it was emphasized that ‘the
paramount principle of equal pay for the same work at the same place
must be accepted and included in the Revised Directive as its most essen-
tial provision’ (Joint Statement 2017; bold style removed). In a separate
statement, Solidarność (2016) stressed that the proposal went in the right
direction to implement ‘the principle of equal treatment of employees’.
In a later letter—endorsed by a large number of Central/Eastern Euro-
pean unions—on another draft ETUC resolution, it is made clear that
the support for the ETUC’s position on the revison of the PWD was
guided by a future-oriented approach (Solidarność 2019):
We would like to remind that our organizations, despite pressure from
governments and public opinion in our countries, maintained a common
and identical [view] with the ETUC’s position on amendments to the
Posted Workers Directive. It was because we were looking forward. We
understood that we could not be guided by short-term gains in form
of enabling our entrepreneurs to build their comparative advantage by
competing on the basis of lower wage costs.
In searching for other statements on the PWD revision, we have con-
tacted researchers in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and they have pro-
vided information from their respective countries, after consulting with
trade unionists. This data collection did not reveal any discontent with
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the Commission’s proposal. There is nothing to indicate that Cen-
tral/Eastern European trade unions to any significant degree sympathize
with the views of the critical politicians and parliaments. It should per-
haps not be entirely ruled out that some dissatisfaction could exist below
the surface. One relevant question to ask in this context is to what extent
posted workers are represented by the labour organizations, given the
generally low union density rates in the region.
Trade unions and employers’ associations have as a rule responded
very differently to the European Commission’s proposal for revision of
the PWD. The former organizations were relatively positive, whereas—
with the EBC as an exception—the latter were sceptical, to a large extent
on the same grounds as many of the parliaments in Central/Eastern
European countries. When the trade unions put forward criticism, it
was mainly because they believed the suggested reform did not go far
enough to create equality between posted and local workers. Concerning
the questions raised in this article, it is important to notice that the trade
unions in those Central/Eastern European Member States where the par-
liaments sent a yellow card to the European Commission did not agree
with their parliaments.
Conclusion and Discussion
The facts examined in this chapter show that the responses to the Euro-
pean Commission’s proposal of a revision of the PWD were divided.
There was a clear East–West division in the reactions from European
politicians. Ministers in nine countries in Central/Eastern Europe and
the parliaments in ten countries in the region raised their voice against
the revision. Contrary to this, some Southern European parliaments
responded in favour of it. In the European Parliament, the Group of
Socialists and Democrats was positive and the European Conservatives
and Reformists were negative. Regarding the social partners, employers’
organizations were typically negative—although with some exception—
while the trade union confederations at European level were positive
but not uncritical; they argued that the reform did not go far enough.
Interestingly, there seemed to be no manifest East–West cleavage in the
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trade union movement. In spite of strong negative reactions in many
Central/Eastern European parliaments, the main labour organizations in
these countries supported the dominant trade union responses. Basically,
they were all on the same side in welcoming the revision. In other words,
a rather predictable employer-trade union pattern comes into sight.
The European Commission emphasized that social dumping had to
be tackled. In consequence, it was essential that the same work in the
same place would be paid the same. This was a crucial objective of the
revision of the PWD, but it does not mean that the implementation
of the Commission’s proposal will really lead to equal pay for equal
work. At best, as the ETUC pointed out, there would be equal pay
for some posted workers. One thing to be aware of is that not even all
local employees get the same remuneration for the same kind of job.
How could it then be possible for posted workers to get the same pay
as local workers? Still, it should not be denied that the PWD revision
can be a step in reducing differences between posted and local employ-
ees. This implies that the competitive advantages that companies from
Central/Eastern European countries have in the provision of services in
high-wage countries will shrink. The opportunities of competing with
labour costs and social dumping will no longer be as obvious as before.
It is the restrictions of these opportunities that many Central/Eastern
European politicians have protested against. The trade unions in the
same nations have not agreed, but instead consented to the opinions
against social dumping expressed by the significant European trade union
confederations. They made a choice which set them apart from the rather
strong sentiments at home. Is this due to self-interest or to their support
of wider union solidarity norms?
There is hardly any definite answer to that question. The classifica-
tion of industrial relations regimes does not give us any guidance in
this regard. We can interpret the evidence as an indication of solidarity
between trade unions in different parts of Europe. These organizations
appear to be in solidarity with each other, which implies that in many
Central/Eastern European countries they take a position contrary to the
views of the dominant politicians. They have chosen transnational union
cooperation rather than the national road for the future.
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One aspect to consider is that the statements on the revision of the
PWD were made by central-level unionists in the ETUC, the EFBWW
and other organizations. These are unionists who may more easily reach
consensus, because they do not directly experience the effects of reforms
(cf. Bernaciak 2011). It may be simpler for them to adhere to com-
mon trade union ideology with its values and norms. We must not
therefore completely reject the idea of the effects of solidarity ideology
and a neo-institutionalist perspective may help us to see its influence
(Pernicka and Glassner 2012, 2014; Pernicka et al. 2015). Nonetheless,
we must also take the role of tangible advantages into account, as Berna-
ciak (2012, 2013, 2015) has reminded us time after time. Cooperation
with other European unions is in many ways important for the weak
Central/Eastern European organizations. The latter are likely to have
much to gain from sharing the experiences of others and many of them
receive handy assistance in building up their activities. This is some-
thing that they probably find worth keeping. Also, in the long run, more
equal remuneration of posted and local workers may be beneficial for all.
Competing with lower labour costs can perhaps generate benefits in the
short run, but these may become insignificant in a longer perspective.
Yet another aspect is the social dumping in Central/Eastern European
nations due to the inflow of workers from countries such as Belarus,
Moldova and the Ukraine. How should the Central/Eastern European
trade unions respond to such developments? They no doubt have several
good reasons to safeguard the principle of equal pay for equal work in
the same place.
The fact that labour organizations across Europe share the same or
similar views on the revision of the PWD has consequences for transna-
tional trade union cooperation. Being in agreement on this issue will
certainly facilitate such collaboration within the European trade union
movement. The discussion of the revision of the PWD can be said to
have been consensus-building. In that sense, it has promoted or con-
firmed a cooperative climate. As we could see in the previous chapter,
not all issues have developed in such a way. There are other challenges
for the European trade unions to deal with.
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Notes
1. With the definitions used in the report, high-wage countries include
Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Iceland,
Lichtenstein Norway and Switzerland. Low-wage countries are Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Roma-
nia and Bulgaria. In addition, there is also a medium-wage category:
Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Malta, Slovenia and Portugal.
2. From its start in 1996 up to 2012 it was called the ‘European Employee
Forum’ (Pernicka et al. 2015: 9).
3. A yellow card procedure means that the initiator of a legislative change,
in this case the European Commission, must reconsider its proposal. It
requires one-third of the votes to be effective. The eleven countries rep-
resent 22 votes, three votes above the threshold.
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Abstract This chapter summarizes the previous analyses in the book in
which results from two research projects are presented. Both projects
aimed at examining cross-border trade union cooperation in Europe and
the conditions for its development. The studies are based on data from
different sources: interviews, surveys, documents and direct observations
at meetings. They concentrate on actual patterns of cooperative activ-
ities, their forms and focuses, and on attitudes among unions to such
activities. One aspect that is addressed is what factors labour organiza-
tions regard as positive and negative for collaboration. The chapter also
sums up how the trade unions have dealt with two vital issues during
the last decades: statutory minimum wages and the Posting of Workers
Directive.
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In this book we have presented results from two research projects. The
main object of study in both projects was cross-border trade union coop-
eration in Europe and the conditions for its development. We have con-
centrated on its actual activities, on the forms and focuses it has had, and
on attitudes among labour organizations to it. Another aspect is which
factors unions regard as most important in preventing or promoting col-
laboration. In separate chapters, our book also deals with two examples
of specific issues which have been of vital interest for the trade unions
during the last decades: statutory minimum wages and the Posting of
Workers Directive (PWD).
The analyses are based on data from different sources: interviews, sur-
veys, documents and direct observations at meetings. The collection of
data is described in more detail in Chapter 1. We have conducted two
surveys with key representatives of trade unions: one in 2011–2012 and
the other in 2015–2016. In addition, we have interviewed a large num-
ber of top-level trade union officials. Documents have been utilized con-
tinuously throughout the projects. For some time, one of our colleagues
in the research team got the opportunity to participate in the ETUC
Executive Committee meetings.
A general result from our quantitative analyses is that the theories
of (national) industrial relations regimes/regions, sectoral regimes and
organizational power resources have supplementary explanatory power.
In that sense, they are relevant in a study of transnational trade union
cooperation in Europe. However, as illustrated by the two in-depth case
studies of national trade union positions on statutory minimum wages
and on the revision of the PWD, such classifications are of limited help
in explaining what is going on when we encounter both solidarity and
conflicting interests in transnational trade union cooperation. In the
examples mentioned, the approach has to take more specific issue-related
conditions into consideration.
A common classification of industrial relations discussed in Chapter 1
includes five regime types: a social partnership model in Central/Western
Europe, organized corporatism in the Nordic countries, liberal plural-
ism above all in the British Isles, a polarized/state-centred type in South-
ern Europe, and a transitional or fragmented variety in Central/Eastern
Europe. It is a fruitful classification for many purposes, but as always
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when we reduce a large amount of information to a smaller number of
categories there is a risk that intra-category differences are hidden. Some-
times diverging characteristics within regimes need to be highlighted and
we have to be careful not to suppress them behind an overall concept.
Unions are more or less powerful in the different regime types. They
are strongest in the Nordic region with its organized corporatism and as
a rule weakest in Central/East European countries. Union strength can
be derived from various sources and four of them are: high member-
ship and a well-functioning organization (organizational power), posi-
tion in the economy and relationship with employers (structural power),
legal rights (institutional power) and alliances with political or civil soci-
ety organizations (societal power). Strong trade unions frequently obtain
their capacity from different sources, perhaps all the four mentioned.
When using union size as a proxy for resources in our analyses, a
consistent result was that the larger the union, the more transnational
cooperation it could take part in. However, it takes ‘two to tango’ not
only in bargaining with employer organizations, but also in collaboration
between unions. Our results indicate that the more resourceful unions
are also hampered by the lack of resources among others. The reason
can be that the latter have to forgo from participating in meetings and
that cooperation may merely take the form of unilateral support rather
than mutual exchange. In addition, we should not neglect the effects
of insufficient power resources on joint decision-making and influenc-
ing the agenda of the ETUC and the ETUFs. One example is how the
many but less resourceful trade unions have had problems to raise wage
issues on the European agenda, even though there appears to be an inter-
est to do so. As discussed in the analysis of statutory minimum wages in
Chapter 3, the Nordic organizations join forces to keep such questions
from the agenda.
The differences between regimes stand out rather significantly on
their preferences for contentious action and their choice of cooperation
through own versus cooperative channels in trying to influence EU poli-
cies. The Nordic unions differ significantly from the Central/Western
and Southern European organizations by being relatively more restric-
tive in the former respect. On the choice of channels in trying to influ-
ence EU policies, there is a similarly tangible difference between the
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Nordics, on the one hand, and the Southern and Central/Eastern Euro-
pean regimes, on the other. The former emphasized the importance of
working through their national political parties and their Brussels offices
and the latter put much more weight on working through the ETUC and
the ETUFs. The labour organizations in Southern and Central/Eastern
Europe were also much more ready to transfer authority to these organi-
zations than the Nordic counterparts were.
Sector or industry is another relevant category, above all because some
sectors (e.g., manufacturing) are subject to fierce international market
competition, while others (e.g., many public and private services) have
a more sheltered position with respect to international and sometimes
also domestic competition. It is therefore relevant to make compar-
isons between sectors; it may even generate more exciting and relevant
knowledge than comparisons between regimes. A recurrent feature in our
analyses was that the cooperation networks in the metal industry were
more developed and intense than in the services industry, with construc-
tion and transport being somewhere in between these ends. Evidently,
there were also important sectoral differences regarding topics of coop-
eration. For example, unions in construction were inclined to focus on
occupational health and safety and migration issues and unions in the
metal sector were more concerned with issues of unemployment and
employment.
In the beginning of Chapter 2, we presented a classification into
four structures of institutionalized cooperation between trade unions: (1)
communication, (2) coordination and (3) cooperation networks and (4)
meta-organizations, representing different degrees of institutionalization.
Actually, all these types exist in Europe and they are in practice inter-
twined. The most advanced collaborative form takes place in organiza-
tions such as the ETUC and the ETUFs, which are meta-organizations,
characterized by having other organizations as members. The analysis
indicates that bi- and multilateral networking among trade unions is very
much related to what these European meta-organizations do. The dif-
ferent overlapping cooperation structures are mutually reinforcing each
other.
When examining whether collaboration in national and international
meta-organizations, according to the unions themselves, had become
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more or less important during the last ten years, we found that respon-
dents tended to reply that it had gained greater importance, which was
most clear in relation to the sectoral ETUFs. This was confirmed by
many trade unions that preferred to strengthen transnational coopera-
tion within their sector rather than within their country for the future.
Still, fairly large proportions answered ‘same as previously’, whereas only
few said that the significance of cooperation with any of the meta-
organizations listed had decreased.
Another topic dealt with was how trade unions looked upon the Euro-
pean sectoral social dialogue. Large majorities recognized its importance
for strengthening transnational trade union cooperation, for influenc-
ing EU policies, for negotiations with employers’ associations and for
meeting workers’ interests. Nevertheless, a clear majority of the respon-
dents had doubts whether participation was worthwhile, given the time
and resources it takes to be involved in the dialogues. This indicates that
many unions have a tight financial situation and are understaffed.
Moreover, a network analysis showed some interesting patterns of
trade union cooperation. A most striking outcome was that unions
were very much oriented towards other unions in the same region. It
was most obvious for the Nordic organizations. Given the discussion
of mutual reinforcement between formal meta-organizations and infor-
mal network structures, this is not surprising since it is only among
the Nordic trade unions that we see joint meta-organizations at cross-
national regional level. For Southern Europe a similar but somewhat
weaker intra-regional focus appeared. Unions in Central/Western and
Central/Eastern Europe presented proportionately more ties with orga-
nizations outside their own region, but they still had almost half of their
partners internally. Resources and general influence may play a role in
these results, but another factor to consider is geographic location. Cen-
tral/Western Europe has borders with all the other regions in Europe, a
circumstance that can be expected to facilitate cross-border contacts.
When scrutinizing the trade unions’ concrete cooperative activities, we
observed that the most frequent activities were to write statements, peti-
tions or open letters. More contentious forms of action such as overtime
bans, strikes and blockades were less regular and it was then common
that the organizations collaborated within their own country rather than
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transnationally in Europe. As regards information on collective agree-
ments, writing joint statements, petitions or open letters and training
of union officials, we ran into some substantial transnational coopera-
tion between unions in the same sector as well as between unions in the
home country.
The most common topics for trade union cooperation in the home
country were employment protection legislation and occupational health
and safety. A little bit behind, we found issues concerning wages, unem-
ployment/employment, professional matters and working time. The top
topics for collaboration with foreign trade unions within the same sec-
tor—all with lower incidence—were occupational health and safety, pro-
fessional issues, employment protection legislation and migration.
An important question is which factors trade unions view as obsta-
cles to cross-border cooperation. Differences in financial resources among
unions emerged as the most important obstacle. Resources are related to
union density rates; with larger proportions of employees paying mem-
bership fees, the better equipped are the organizations. However, differ-
ences in union membership rates were not judged to be a very significant
obstacle. We should not because of that underestimate their role. There
are enormous differences in union density across Europe, from the high
levels in the Nordic region to the very low levels in most Central/East
European countries and France. The organizations’ financial and person-
nel resources are negatively affected if only small proportions of employ-
ees are members. Such assets are crucial for participating in cross-border
cooperation. It is difficult to send representatives to the ETUC meet-
ings, when there are many commitments at home and tight budgets and
staffing do not allow the organizations to be fully involved in all matters.
Moreover, an obvious problem is that union density tends to decline
almost everywhere in Europe. This development has a negative impact
on resources for all the unions hit. It is of course especially problematic
when membership is low from the beginning. We should also keep in
mind that declining density rates are not only a question of resources;
such development may also affect the legitimacy of unions. Organiza-
tions claiming to speak for the collective of employees need to have a
significant proportion of possible followers as members. On the other
hand, the example of France seems to suggest something else; union
5 Concluding Discussion 147
density in France is very low, but the labour organizations are influen-
tial. They are more or less successful in calling for demonstrations and
strikes, but collective agreements are frequently extended by law and the
law also requires companies with 50 employees or more to consult union
delegates about many managerial decisions. France may be exceptional
and we must admit that it is impossible to identify a critical point where
unions completely lose legitimacy.
The second most important obstacle to transnational trade union
cooperation was considered to be the diversity of labour market poli-
cies and regulations. This is another way of saying that industrial rela-
tions regimes are of great consequence. The fact that we can distinguish
industrial relations types is in itself an indicator of the difficulties that
cross-border trade union cooperation has to confront. It is likely that
collaboration is easier within a regime than between regimes. The results
mentioned previously on intra-regional collaboration imply that this
argument has some relevance.
It is also noteworthy that cultural factors were not deemed to be very
important barriers to cross-border trade union cooperation. This is not
to say that they are negligible; they were merely judged as less impor-
tant than certain other factors. In our interviews with union representa-
tives, we got many vivid examples of how cultural differences can have a
negative impact on collaboration, although—on the other hand—some
interviewees wanted to downplay their role.
Mirroring these obstacles, we also found that similarities instead of
differences facilitated transnational trade union cooperation. The results
were largely reversed in comparison with the outcomes on perceived bar-
riers, although in this case there were fewer items for respondents to
answer. Similarities in labour market policies and regulations came first
in the ranking of facilitators, followed by similarities in occupational
interests among unions and union leaders’ personal networks and rela-
tions. Consistent with the previous outcomes, cultural resemblances were
assessed as relatively less important.
As said above, we also examined how European trade unions have
dealt with a couple of specific issues. Chapter 3 addresses the question of
statutory minimum wages. Most countries in Europe have such arrange-
ments, but the Nordic cluster of nations is an exception, together with
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a few others. On this topic, there is an unmistakeably deep cleavage in
the European trade union movement; some are for legislation, while oth-
ers are against. In the Nordic region where trade unions are strong and
reliant on their own systems of collective bargaining, resistance to min-
imum wage legislation is especially firm. In most other countries, the
labour organizations’ views are the opposite. A crucial part of the expla-
nation is that when unions are too weak to secure reasonable wage levels
for all workers, legislation can be the way out; it is no wonder if it is then
assessed to be an indispensable solution.
Our second survey included six statements, formulated to reflect pos-
sible advantages and disadvantages with legislation on minimum wages.
Respondents were requested to tell how much they agreed on each of
these. Unions in countries with legislation were mostly affirmative of
claims that legislation is the best method for unorganized workers to
obtain decent wages, that it can impede wage dumping and that it is a
necessary arrangement to prevent poverty. Above all the Nordic unions—
but to some extent also others in countries without legislation—did not
agree very much on these statements. Instead, they were more aware of
the potential drawbacks of minimum wage legislation. They tended to
think that it undermines the role of trade unions and that it may lead
to lower collectively agreed wages. The result was a bit different on an
item whether statutory minimum wages would have a negative impact on
unions’ possibilities of recruiting members. Some of the generally nega-
tive Nordic unions agreed with this, but a higher proportion answered
‘to a low degree’ or ‘not at all’. Among the other unions, there was little
sympathy for the argument that legislated minimum wages would create
recruitment problems for unions.
It is obvious that the European trade union movement is unable to
form a united front on this issue. In terms of cooperation, unions that
advocate statutory minimum wages can work jointly to reach their goals,
but also unions that do not want to have legislation can go together to
prevent it. The ETUC has established a compromise formula, according
to which national traditions and specialities should be respected. Col-
lective bargaining is treated as the best method to secure decent wages,
but in countries where this is not achievable there is a need for legis-
lation. It is thus unlikely that we—on this matter—see a joint effort
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from the whole European trade union movement. In that respect, cross-
border cooperation has apparently encountered a limit. On the other
hand, there are repeatedly new initiatives on the question of statutory
minimum wages and it remains to be seen what will happen with these.
The other issue paid special attention to in this book is the revision of
the PWD. It started with a proposal from the European Commission in
March 2016. The main goal was to achieve equal pay for equal work in
the same place and to get a level playing field for businesses. The Com-
mission wanted to change the PWD with regard to three main aspects:
remuneration of posted workers; rules on temporary agency workers; and
long-term posting. It was proposed that remuneration should be intro-
duced as a key concept instead of the PWD’s concept of minimum rates
of pay. Remuneration would include other elements such as bonuses and
pay increases due to seniority. The proposal aimed at the same rules of
remuneration for posted and local workers, given that these rules were
defined by law or by ‘universally applicable collective agreements’. The
Commission also suggested that the latter principle would be extended
to posted workers in all economic sectors and not only to those in the
construction industry. In addition, Member States should have the possi-
bility of applying the same regulations in case of subcontracting. Another
part of the proposal was that posted temporary agency workers would be
treated the same way as the local equivalents. As domestic agency work-
ers are supposed to have the same conditions as their colleagues in the
user company, the Commission wanted to extend this principle also to
those posted by temporary work agencies from other Member States.
Yet another suggestion was that postings lasting longer than 24 months
should make workers subject to the labour laws of the host Member
State. This was already the case according to the social security legis-
lation, but the principle would hence be extended to labour law.
The revision of the PWD has now been adopted by both the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Council—with some modifications
of the Commission’s proposal. In this book we examine the discussion
that followed when the Commission had made its plan public. The opin-
ions really went in very different directions in Europe. Important orga-
nizations like the ETUC and the EFBWW welcomed the proposal but
expressed that it did not go far enough to achieve the goals identified.
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They warned of the risk that the result would merely be equal pay for
some workers.
Most interesting was how the Central/Eastern European trade unions
would react. The reason why the answer could not be taken for granted
was the strong negative responses from politicians in the region. Min-
isters in nine countries in Central/Eastern Europe and ten parliaments
in the same region opposed the revision. In contrast to this, some other
parliaments supported it. Thus the trade unions in the East could join
either their national politicians or the wider European trade union move-
ment. They actually selected the second alternative or remained silent.
We have not discovered any organization that raised its voice against the
proposal. Differences in industrial relations regime or in union strength
did not create barriers to a common position; the European trade union
movement was able to hold together.
The main idea behind trade unionism is that employees should orga-
nize themselves collectively to improve or at least defend their employ-
ment and working conditions. In this process, they can then prove to
be in solidarity with each other and against employers, although there
are usually many difficulties and obstacles to overcome. Declining union
density rates is one of the problems. The situation becomes even more
complicated when organizations in multiple countries—with different
economic, institutional and cultural settings—are involved. The trade
union movement often speaks in favour of internationalism, but it is far
from always clear what this should mean in practice. We must not take
for granted that unions in different countries can regularly agree on what
they want to achieve. Cross-border trade union cooperation has obtained
notable results in Europe, but the question of what is in the best interests
of employees frequently remains open. Consequently, trade unions face
severe present-day problems and many difficult challenges for the future.
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